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COLLUSION AND COLLECTIVE 
ACTION IN THE PATENT SYSTEM: A 
PROPOSAL FOR PATENT BOUNTIES 
John R. Thomas* 
Persistent commentary contends that the Patent Office is issuing 
patents that appropriate public domain concepts at an alarming fre-
quency. Complaints of low patent quality enjoy growing resonance 
with regard to business methods, computer software, and other inven-
tions for which patents were not traditionally sought. In this article, 
Professor Jay Thomas explains how the judiciary's lenient view of 
patentable subject matter and utility standards, along with miserly 
congressional funding policies, have rendered the Patent Office an in-
creasingly porous agency. 
Professor Thomas next reviews existing proposals for improving 
patent quality, including the conventional wisdom that adoption of an 
opposition system will contribute meaningfully to the solution of our 
patent quality problem. Exploring the political economy of patent 
challenges, Professor Thomas reasons that oppositions do little to 
solve collective action problems, the possibility of collusion between 
the prior art holder and patentee, and the existence of the first inven-
tor defense. Professor Thomas instead proposes that the Patent Of-
fice recruit members of the public to act as private patent examiners. 
By awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed against ap-
plicants, the Patent Office can restore order to the patent system and 
reduce its social costs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The patent system has reaped a dubious harvest from policies of the 
past decade. An unbridled judicial vision of patentable subject matter 
has enlarged the scope of appropriable inventions from traditional tech-
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. 
The author wishes to thank Marty Adelman, Gregory Aharonian, Ian Ayres, Julie Cohen, Ro-
chelle Dreyfuss, Mark Janis, Jay Kesan, Mark Lemley, Gideon Parchomovsky, Jerry Reichman, and 
Rodger Schechter for their helpful remarks. I also benefited greatly from interactions with participants 
at the University of Illinois College of Law and Institute of Government and Public Affairs symposium 
on: Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century, as well as from discussions following work-
shop presentations at the Cornell Law School and Georgetown University Law Center. 
305 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  306 2001
306 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2001 
nologies to virtually any human endeavor.1 The coupling of this ambi-
tious sense of patent eligibility with congressional policies that stripped 
sorely needed resources from the Patent Office has once again focused 
withering criticism upon the regime of patents.2 Observers have directed 
attention to a host of improvidently granted patents,3 passionately urged 
that patent attorneys are "stealing our future,,,4 and generally declared 
the patent system to be in a state of crisis.s This chorus of complaints en-
joys an increasing resonance with regard to business methods, computer 
software, and other inventions that until recently were believed without 
the patent system.6 
This article identifies the problems of a patent system in transition 
and proposes specific reforms. It is written with some sense of urgency. 
Experience teaches us that the patent system is prone to abuse by the 
monopolist and speculator, and that the inevitable public reaction is one 
of cynicism and hostility towards patents. Intemperate patenting of soft-
ware and business methods appears well on its way to breeding further 
distrust. If the patent system cannot achieve greater accessibility and ac-
countability to the unfamiliar disciplines now under its wing, many of the 
spectacular reforms it has achieved over the past twenty years may go for 
naught.7 
This article begins in part II by briefly explaining core economic and 
legal principles of the patent law. In part III, I consider contentions that 
the Patent Office is issuing patents of poor quality in disciplines unfamil-
iar to it. This part reviews the unfortunate combination of events that al-
lowed Congress to deprive the Patent Office of funding while the Federal 
Circuit vastly expanded the possibilities for patentable subject matter. 
The stakes are high, part III concludes, because many inventions that 
have only recently been judged as patentable concern information goods. 
Such postindustrial products frequently exhibit network effects and pro-
mote lock-in, and their associated patents need not be judged as valid for 
very long to have significant market effects. 
1. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.c. L. REv. 1139, 1139 
(1999). 
2. More properly the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.c. § 1 (1994). 
3. E.g., Byron L. Winn, Readers Say, FORBES, May 31,1999, at 18 (ridiculing the granting of a 
patent for the Dutch auction); Legal Resources and Tools for Surviving the Patenting Frenzy of the 
Internet, Bioinformatics, and Electronic Commerce: Archive of Bad Software/Internet Patents, at 
http://www.bustpatents.com (last visited January 16, 2(01) (listing invalidated patents) (on file with the 
University of Illinois Law Review). 
4. Jesse Berst, How Patent Attorneys Are Stealing Our Future, ZDNET (Jan. 18, 2000), at 
http://www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/story/story._4364.html (on file with the University of Illinois Law 
Review). 
5. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,591 (1999). 
6. See John R. Thomas, The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 3, 10--17 (1999). 
7. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,24--25 (1989). 
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In part IV, I review recent patent reform proposals directed towards 
patent quality problems. This article discovers that the academic com-
munity has supported the adoption of so-called opposition proceedings 
with extraordinary vigor and unanimity.s Typically styled after proceed-
ings conducted in the European Patent Office, oppositions allow inter-
ested members of the public to contest the merits of a pending patent 
application or issued patent at the Patent Office.9 If only we can make 
oppositions inexpensive and efficient enough to supplant notoriously re-
source-intensive patent litigation, we are made to understand, stake-
holders will flock to the Patent Office with pertinent patent-defeating 
references. \0 This conventional wisdom has made its way to Congress, as 
evidenced by the October 3, 2000, introduction of H.R. 5364, titled the 
Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000.11 If enacted, intro-
duction of H.R. 5364 would establish opposition procedures for patent 
applications claiming business method inventions.12 
This article urges further reflection upon the utility of oppositions in 
solving patent quality problems. Opposition proposals may not have suf-
ficiently accounted for private incentives that are misaligned with the 
public interest in defeating invalid patents. Put another way, oppositions 
present considerable externalities. Not only are opposition regimes ripe 
with collective action and free rider problems, they do not account for 
the possibility of collusion between the patentee and holder of patent-
defeating prior art. Recent legislative developments will likely exagger-
ate these tendencies within the area of business methods. By creating a 
defense for earlier inventors of business methods that were later pat-
ented by another,13 Congress may have provided those individuals best 
able to defeat an invalid patent with a more attractive alternative for es-
caping infringement liability. 
Part V of this article suggests that we assume a different tack. I 
propose that the Patent Office award cash prizes to informants who 
timely disclose patent-defeating references. Such a regime will establish 
a class of private patent examiners who are encouraged to research and 
disclose patent-defeating references. If patent applicants themselves are 
assessed this bounty, then the Patent Office will also encourage patent 
applicants to determine the pertinent prior art and draft patent claims of 
8. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to 
Innovate,72 VA. L. REv. 677, 754 n.277 (1986); Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a 
Viable Administrative Revocation System for u.s. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997); 
Merges, supra note 5, at 611-12; Craig A. Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. 
L.J. 759 (1999); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.V. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11,31 (1997). 
9. See infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text. 
10. E.g., Merges, supra note 5, at 615. 
11. Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364, 106th Congo (2000) (intro-
duced by the Honorable Howard Berman on Oct. 3,2000). 
12. See id. § 3. 
13. See 35 V.S.c.A. § 273 (West Supp. 2000). 
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the appropriate scope. This analysis continues addressing anticipated 
concerns about the proposed patent bounty in part VI. 
II. CORE PRECEPTS OF PATENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. Collective Action in Innovation 
Like other goods, innovative products and processes may be ana-
lyzed in terms of two economic characteristics. The first is whether the 
benefits of the good are excludable.14 The owner of a bottle of wine may 
prevent others from drinking, but the producer of radio signals broad-
casts for all to hear. The second trait is whether consumption of the 
good is rivalrous. ls If one person's use of the good necessarily diminishes 
the benefits of another'S use, then it is said to be a rival good. For nonri-
val goods such as pleasing parkway scenery, all may benefit from the 
good without diminishing the benefits of others. 
Goods vary in their degrees of excludability and rivalrousness. 
Those that are fully nonexcludable and nonrivalrous are termed public 
goods.16 The production of public goods is subject to market failure, for 
their nonexcludable and nonrival traits suggest that they will be under-
produced relative to social needY Potential producers of public goods 
are uncertain whether they will benefit from the good sufficiently to jus-
tify their labors.18 They would also prefer to free ride off the labors of 
others, certain that they can enjoy the benefits of the good once someone 
else builds it.19 Individuals will therefore tend to produce goods with 
greater excludability and rivalrousness.2o 
The production of desirable public goods is said to present a prob-
lem of collective action.21 Society as a whole favors the development of 
certain public goods, ranging from military defense to flood control pro-
jects.22 Private citizens may lack sufficient incentives to produce them, 
however, leading to suboptimal social outcomes. Government is 
uniquely suited towards solving collective action problems by modifying 
individual incentives to engage in desirable behavior.23 
The patent system is exemplary of this sort of market intervention. 
As information products, inventions exhibit the characteristics of public 
goods.24 They are nonexcludable, for whether the invention consists of a 
14. See A VINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEA TH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 357 (2ooo). 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 189 (1994). 
18. See id. 
19. See DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 14, at 358. 
20. See id. at 357. 
21. See id. at 368--69. 
22. See id. at 356-57. 
23. [d. at 357. 
24. See PRAJIT K. DUTT A, STRATEGIES AND GAMES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 179-80 (1999). 
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new machine, molecule or merchandising concept, others who learn of its 
nature may become imitators.25 They are also nonrival, for competitive 
uses do not impact an inventor's personal ability to exploit the inven-
tion.26 These externalities are said to discourage inventive activity and 
diminish progress. 
The patent law ameliorates this market failure by allowing individu-
als to obtain proprietary rights in their inventionsY This property rule 
entitlement creates excludability for patented information products, al-
lowing inventors to prevent free riders from benefiting from their inven-
tions.28 By diminishing the public goods aspects of inventions, the patent 
system encourages individuals to increase their investment in innovative 
activities. 
Patent rights do not arise automatically. Ideally, proprietary rights 
would be awarded only to those inventors who were actually motivated 
by the prospect of obtaining a patent, rather than those who acted due to 
market forces or scientific curiosity, or who enjoyed the happy accident 
of serendipitous invention.29 With individual inducement difficult to as-
certain, in practice the Patent Office employs more humble mechanisms 
for determining whether to award a patent or not. Following the submis-
sion of a patent application, an examiner will consider whether the appli-
cation fully discloses and distinctly claims the invention.30 The examiner 
will also determine whether the claimed invention itself meets certain 
substantive standards set by the patent statute.31 To be patentable, the 
claimed invention must possess utility, comprise statutory subject matter, 
and be both novel and nonobvious in view of knowledge within the pub-
lic domain.32 
These four substantive requirements weigh unevenly in the pat-
entability determination. For most inventions, the utility and statutory 
subject matter inquiries play only a minor role in deciding whether a pat-
ent should issue or not.33 These standards have not always been so len i-
25. See id. 
26. E.g., DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 14, at 357; DUTIA, supra note 24, at 179-80. 
27. See 35 U.S.c. § 271(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing patentee with exclusive rights to make, 
use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States, or import into the United States, the patented inven-
tion). 
28. See THOMAS A. MANDEVILLE, UNDERSTANDING NOVELTY: INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGI· 
CAL CHANGE AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 92-93 (1996). 
29. See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 277-81 (1996). 
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). 
31. These requirements apply to so-called utility patents. The patent statutes also allow for de-
sign patents, see 35 U.s.c. § 171 (1994), and plant patents, see 35 U.S.C. § 16. Subject matter and other 
patentability standards differ somewhat for these more specialized patent regimes. 
32. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 2 (1998). 
33. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 811-12 (1988); Thomas, supra note 1, at 1160. 
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ent. A brief review of the case law suggests their increasing minimaliza-
tion under the stewardship of the Federal Circuit.34 
In its 1966 decision in Brenner v. Manson,35 the Supreme Court first 
employed the utility requirement to affirm the rejection of a patent ap-
plication. There the applicant claimed a steroid that was structurally 
similar to a compound known to inhibit tumors in mice. At the time the 
patent application was filed, however, no use for the claimed steroid yet 
had been discovered.36 The Court affirmed the Patent Office' rejection of 
the application, explaining that in order to possess utility within the 
meaning of the patent statute, an invention must confer a "specific bene-
fit ... in currently available form.,,37 
Brenner v. Manson had great impact in the chemical arts, where re-
searchers frequently generate compounds with unknown behaviors.38 
Such compounds are often structurally similar to known chemicals with 
beneficial properties.39 Typically researchers hope that the new com-
pounds have superior properties or lack the undesirable side effects of 
the known chemical. The behavior of chemical compounds is often pre-
dictable, however, and only subsequent testing will tell whether the com-
pound has any desirable properties at all. 40 Here the Supreme Court in-
structed inventors to delay filing a patent application until that 
determination has been reached.41 Brenner v. Manson provided a power-
ful tool for rejecting patents on human gene fragments, chemicals, and 
other products with unknown uses. 
Brenner v. Manson can now be seen as the high-water mark of the 
utility requirement.42 The Federal Circuit case law has significantly re-
treated from this standard. The leading Federal Circuit opinion on util-
ity, In re Brana,43 also concerned an application claiming a chemical 
compound. The applicant asserted the compound acted as an antitumor 
agent, citing a structurally similar compound that exhibited this behav-
ior.44 The Patent Office held that these assertions were too vague and 
suffered from lack of proof of a therapeutic utility.45 The Federal Circuit 
34. Although this discussion applies to most fields amenable to patenting, the force of the pat· 
entability requirements differs in some disciplines. In particular, the nonobviousness standard appears 
quite lenient for certain biotechnologies, see In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995), while the 
written description requirement may be of greater significance, see Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
35. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
36. See id. at 531. 
37. Id. at 534-35. 
38. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.02[2] (2000). 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35. 
42. See Phanesh Koneru, To Promote the Progress of Useful Art[icleJs?: An Analysis of the Cur-
rent Utility Standards of Pharmaceutical Products and Biotechnological Research Tools, 38 IDEA 625, 
628 (1998). 
43. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
44. Seeid. at 1562-63. 
45. Seeid. at 1563-64. 
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reversed the Patent Office rejection, holding that the compound's struc-
tural similarity to known, useful compounds sufficiently evidenced util-
ity.46 
Brana and Brenner v. Manson are difficult to reconcile. The Fed-
eral Circuit apparently thought so as well, for the Brana decision neglects 
even to cite Brenner v. Manson.47 The Brana court's further statement 
that "[t]he purpose of treating cancer with chemical compounds does not 
suggest an inherently unbelievable undertaking or involve implausible 
scientific principles" suggests a greatly diminished role for the utility re-
quirement even in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnological 
arts.48 For most inventions, the utility requirement now appears to be 
satisfied by only a minimal showing that the invention is operable and 
provides a tangible benefit.49 
More famously, the statutory subject matter requirement too has 
become exceptionally lenient. The patent statute allows a patent to issue 
for a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.,,50 De-
spite the breadth of this language, courts traditionally limited the patent 
system to industrial technologiesY Products and processes that system-
atically manipulated external physical forces in order to modify or fabri-
cate artifacts were judged patentable subject matter.52 Excluded were 
matters of personal skill, aesthetics, commercial strategy, and human be-
havior.53 
The decision of the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. breached this traditional barrier to 
patenting.54 In State Street Bank, the court held that a data processing 
system for managing a mutual fund constituted patentable subject mat-
ter.55 Rejecting the venerable "business methods" exception to pat-
entability, the Federal Circuit held that the key inquiry concerning statu-
tory subject matter involves "the essential characteristics of the subject 
matter, in particular, its practical utility.,,56 By collapsing the statutory 
subject matter and utility requirements, State Street Bank opened the 
patent system to inventions from the entire range of human endeavor. 
46. Seeid. at 1566-67. 
47. See Nathan Machin, Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of 
Section 101 of the Patent Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 423, 432 (1999). 
48. Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566. 
49. Although the Patent Office has recently issued Utility Guidelines that suggest a stricter view 
of the utility requirement, see Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,440, 71,441 
(Dec. 21, 1999), the Guidelines are not binding upon examiners, and whether or not the Federal Cir-
cuit will uphold them remains doubtful. 
50. 35 U.S.c. § 101 (1994). 
51. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 1143-47. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
55. See id. at 1373. 
56. Id. at 1375. 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  312 2001
312 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2001 
Subsequent Federal Circuit decisions have maintained this approach, 
confirming that "virtually anything is patentable.,,57 
As a result of the decline of the utility and subject matter require-
ments, novelty and nonobviousness have come to serve as the principal 
gatekeepers to the patent system. Each of these requirements calls for a 
comparison of the requirements that compare the claimed invention with 
public domain knowledge or, in the vernacular of the patent law, the 
prior art. For an invention to be novel, the claimed invention must not 
be wholly anticipated by the teachings of a single, previous technical dis-
closure.58 To fulfill the non obviousness standard, the claimed invention 
must not have been within the ordinary capabilities of a skilled artisan at 
the time it was made, in light of the teachings of the prior art as a whole.59 
Always a central function of the Patent Office, the task of locating 
prior art pertinent to each submitted application has assumed even 
greater significance. The utility and statutory subject matter standards 
have become increasingly disabled from blocking patents on genetic ma-
terials, Internet-based business models, and other inventions of intense 
public interest. Novelty and non obviousness stand as the principal 
mechanisms for denying most patent applications, but these require-
ments are effective only when the Patent Office knows of prior art appli-
cable to the claimed invention. This article next takes a closer look at 
core prior art concepts, as well as Patent Office mechanisms for gather-
ing prior art references. 
B. Prior Art in the Patent Law 
The patent statute defines the prior art pertinent to each application 
in § 102.60 Information meeting the requirements of this provision must 
be contrasted with the claimed invention in order to decide the issues of 
novelty and nonobviousness.61 Section 102 is long, Byzantine, and not 
easily susceptible to summary. However, its prior art definition generally 
includes all patents and printed publications available anywhere, as well 
as technology known or on sale within the United States.62 These refer-
ences must have been available either prior to the time the invention was 
made,63 or more than one year before the inventor filed an application at 
the Patent Office.64 Many of these references are subject to a minimal 
57. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Oevenger, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane); see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc., 172 
F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999). 
58. See 35 U.S.c. § 102 (1994). 
59. See id. § 103(a). 
60. See id. § 102. 
61. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 205. 
62. See 35 U.S.c. § 102(a)-(b). 
63. See id. § 102(a). 
64. See id. § 102(b). 
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requirement of public availability.65 Section 102 also allows for so-called 
secret prior art, however, which need not have been publicly accessible at 
all.66 . 
The § 102 prior art definition is strikingly broad. Every book, jour-
nal article, leaflet, and student thesis published anywhere in the world in 
any.language potentially serves as prior art.67 Other permissible sources 
of prior art, such as sales offers or knowledge, need not have been for-
mally documented at al1.68 The difficulties inherent in obtaining, organiz-
ing, and analyzing these diverse sources of prior art should be apparent.69 
Facing such dispersed knowledge, the Patent Office has developed 
two. principal investigation techniques. First, examiners conduct their 
own search of the prior art upon turning to each new application.70 The 
Patent Office maintains an impressive library of prior art references in 
order to assist the examining corps.71 Computerized databases addition-
ally allow examiners to search literally millions of domestic and foreign 
patents, more than 5000 journals and over 900 databases.72 
. Patent Office regulations also require applicants to submit pertinent 
prior art of which they are aware.73 Although the Patent Office does not 
itself enforce this rule,74 an accused infringer may raise the defense of in-
equitable conduct in court. If the court concludes that the patentee 
knowingly failed to submit applicable prior art to the Patent Office, then 
it will hold that the patentee engaged in inequitable conduct and declare 
the patent unenforceable.75 By all accounts inequitable conduct is fre-
quently raised during infringement litigation.76 Many Federal Circuit de-
cisions suggest that the applicant's duty to disclose will be strictly en-
forced.77 
65. See State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 305, 316-17 (M.D. Tenn. 
1984), affd in part and rev'd in part, 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. CiT. 1985). 
66. See 35 U.S.c. § 102(g); C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art-Get Your Priorities Straight!, 9 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 149-51 (1996). 
67. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
68. See 35 U.S.c. § 102(b); Pfaffv. Wells Eiecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-69 (1998). 
69. See Nard, supra note 8, at 783-85. 
70. See generally id. at 777 (discussing patent invalidity determinations based on prior art not 
considered by the PTO during prosecution of the patent). 
71. See generally Stephen L. Noe & Alan J. Riddles, A "Searching" Examination of USPTO, 
JPO, EPO and Commercial Data Bases, in ELECfRONIC AND COMPUTER PATENT LAW 205, 227-31 
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 292, 1990). 
72. See Bruce Kisliuk & Jessie Marshall, Business Is Booming, PTO TODAY, Jan. 2000, at 17, 19. 
73. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 736. 
74. See id. at 746. 
75. See id. 
76. See Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. CiT. 1988) ("[T]he habit of 
charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague."). 
77. E.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); Elk Corp. v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 168 F.3d 28, 30 (Fed. CiT. 1999); Baxter Int'!, Inc. v. 
McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 
1089, 1093 (Fed. CiT. 1997); Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. CiT. 1995); General Electro Music Corp. v. 
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Experience suggests that there is ample room for improvement in 
these two information-gathering techniques. The vast Patent Office bib-
liographic resources are balanced by its lack of inquisitorial powers.78 
Absent the ability to compel the disclosure of pertinent facts, examiners 
are virtually unable to locate undocumented or secret prior art.79 Exam-
iners must also take applicants at their word when they attest to such sig-
nificant facts as dates of inventive activity,BO indicia of nonobviousness81 
or the derivation of a prior art reference.82 
The Patent Office is also notorious for its tight employee sched-
ules.83 Examiners are allowed only a limited time to sift through enor-
mous amounts of prior art information.84 The exact amount of time allo-
cated to individual examiners per application is not widely understood 
outside of the Patent Office. The precise formulae are held close to the 
vest by Patent Office management. Apparently, they are also surpris-
ingly complex, accounting for international treaties, examiner seniority, 
the technical complexity of the discipline, and other factors.85 However, 
the average time allocated for an examiner to address one application is· 
understood to be between sixteen and seventeen hours.86 Given the 
complexities involved in parsing an application, conducting a prior art 
search and drafting an Office Action, this period is surprisingly short. 
Applicant disclosures tend to fall in a bimodal distribution, with ei-
ther a minimal number of submitted references or a very large number.87 
A review of Rule 56 explains this feast or famine effect. Although Rule 
56 mandates that applicants disclose known prior art, it does not require 
them to search the prior art in the first place.88 Coupled with the draco-
Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., 
Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
78. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
79. See id. at 139-40. 
80. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT Ex-
AMINING PROCEDURE § 715.07, at 700-139 (7th ed. 1998) (stating that, with respect to proof of dates of 
inventive activity, the Patent Office allows applicants to redact dates from proffered exhibits and 
"merely allege that the acts referred to occurred prior to a specified date") [hereinafter MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING]. 
81. See id. §§ 716 to 716.03, at 700-142 to 700-152. 
82. See id. § 716.02(e), at 700-148 to 700-149. 
83. See Kevin Coughlin, Technology Upends the Meaning of Invention: Patent Requests Shift to 
Ideas, Know-how, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Mar. 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 15869531 (de-
scribing statement by Ronald Stern, President of the Patent Office Professional Association, that 
workdays are broken into six-minute increments, and employees are pressed to work quickly). 
84. See Vasu Jagannathan, Perspectives on U.S. Classification, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC'y 366 (2000); Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental and Emotional States in 
United States Patent Law?, 8 TEx. INTELL. PRoP. L.J. 279, 292 n.60 (2000). 
85. See Interview with Mr. Ronald J. Stern, President, Patent Office Professional Association, in 
Arlington, Va. (June 29, 2000). 
86. See id. 
87. See generally Scott D. Anderson, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and 
Recommended Solutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845 (1999) (discussing the disclosure consequences from a 
finding of inequitable conduct). 
88. See id. at 852. 
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nian consequences of a holding of inequitable conduct,89 many applicants 
are discouraged from conducting prior art searches in the first place. 
Concerned that the failure to disclose a known reference will lead to the 
unenforceability of the patent, some applicants prefer to await the exam-
iner's search results rather than consult the prior art themselves.90 
Where the applicant is already well informed of the prior art, the 
specter of inequitable conduct too often causes applicants to submit vir-
tually every reference of which they are aware.91 Examiners must then 
confront dozens of marginal references rather than a handful of the most 
pertinent ones.92 Coupled with the severe time constraints facing the ex-
amining corps, this overload of information often allows no more than a 
cursory review of all but a few references that initially appear the most 
promising. 
Many litigated cases betray the weaknesses of present Patent Office 
prior art collection techniques.93 Among the defenses available to the ac-
cused infringers is that the asserted patent is invalid.94 This defense may 
be based solely upon prior art considered by the Patent Office.95 But the 
usual defendant is able to locate additional prior art that was not before 
the examiner.96 A recent study indicates that defendants most often turn 
to previously unci ted prior art when raising an invalidity defense, and 
that they are more likely to be successful when they do.97 
Thus, virtually every patent infringement trial becomes an occasion 
for attacking the quality of Patent Office work product. Still, continuing 
commentary contends that the ability of the Patent Office to locate prior 
art pertinent to filed applications is increasingly suspect.98 At a time 
when legal trends have diminished those patentability standards that do 
89. See id. at 861. 
90. See generally id. at 852-53 (suggesting implicitly that applicants will await the examiner's 
search rather than do it themselves). 
91. See generally id. at 845-76 (discussing effects of a finding of inequitable conduct). 
92. See Donald E. Egan, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent To Win in Litigation, in WINNING 
STRATEGIES IN PATENT LITIGATION 9, 30 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. 
Course Handbook Series No. 423, 1995) ("[T]he best practice would be to call the examiner's attention 
to every piece of even remotely relevant prior art as soon as it becomes known to the applicant or his 
attorney."); see also Gary M. Hoffman & Michael C. Greenbaum, The Duty of Disclosure Require-
ments, 16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 124, 149 (1988) ("Since patent practitioners cannot predict 
what a 'reasonable' examiner will find to be 'material,' all known information relating to the applica-
tion at hand, namely prior art, prior patents, publications, etc., should be brought to the attention of 
the PTO in order to avoid a later charge, either by the PTO or during litigation, of inequitable con-
duct."). 
93. See Donald R. Dunner et aI., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions: 
1982-1994, 5 FED. OR. B.J. 151, 158, 163 (1995) (finding that the Federal Circuit held patents invalid 
under § 102 in 87 cases and invalid under § 103 in 132 cases issued from Oct. 1, 1982, through Mar. 15, 
1994). 
94. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Pat-
ents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 185,228 (1998). 
95. See id. at 228-29. 
96. See id. at 231-34. 
97. See id. at 207-11. 
98. See Merges, supra note 5, at 589. 
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not depend upon the prior art, this trend may have severe consequences 
for innovative sectors of our economy. This article takes up the causes 
and implications of our present patent quality problems next. 
III. THE PATENT QUALITY CRISIS 
Business is booming at the Patent Office. The patent application fil-
ing rate has increased at a rate of at least eight percent per year since the 
mid-1990s, with a thirteen percent growth rate in the 1999 fiscal year.99 
The Patent Office forecasts receipt of 335,400 patent applications in 
2001, a seventy-five percent increase in five years. The strong perform-
ance of the U.S. economy and strengthening of foreign patent regimes 
provide some explanation for the growing number of patent applica-
tions. lOO Perhaps the most telling factors, however, have been the dra-
matic expansion of patentable subject matter and the diminution of the 
utility requirement. With industry routinely seeking patent protection 
for gene sequences, software, business methods, and other postindustrial 
inventions, the number of stakeholders in the patent system has greatly 
expanded in recent years. 
At first blush, increasingly permissive Patent Office practices to-
wards statutory subject matter would seem an astoundingly successful 
case of agency expansion of its own jurisdiction. 101 This mission creep 
should have brought tremendous financial benefits for the Patent Office. 
With patent application and other user fees comprising its entire source 
of revenue,102 the Patent Office should literally be awash in funds. In 
fact, the Patent Office finds itself increasingly impoverished during a cru-
cial moment for our intellectual property law. 103 Growing congressional 
reliance upon the inventive community to fund the public fisc has trans-
formed the Patent Office from loss leader to public revenue source. The 
causes and effects of the current lean times at the Patent Office are wor-
thy of explanation. 
For most of its history, the Patent Office charged filing, issuance, 
and other fees that were insufficient to cover its expenses.104 Congress 
allocated additional taxpayer funds to make up the deficit. lOs Facing in-
99. See Kisliuk & Marshall, supra note 72, at 17. 
100. See id. at 18. 
101. See John R. Thomas, Patents and E·Commerce: The United States Experience Post· State 
Street Bank, 16 INTELLECfUELE EIGENDOM & RECLAMERECHT 116, 123 (2000). 
102. See Legislation: Patent and Trademark Office: Witnesses Testify on Diversion of Patent Of-
fice Fees and Business Method Patents, 59 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 659 (2000). 
103. See Hayden Gregory, Congress Slows Pace on IP Legislation, Struggles with PTO User Fee 
Dilemma, MARSHALL L. SCH. CENTER FOR INTELL. PROP. L. NEWS SOURCE 2, 4--5 (Spring 2000), 
available at http://www.jrnls.edulIP/April%20IP%newsletter.pdf. 
104. See id. See generally Valerie Calloway, In the Process of Controverting Its Constitutionally 
Given Purpose the U.S. Patent System Discriminates Against Inventors with Limited Financial Means, 
11 LAW & INEQ. 565,571-75 (1993). 
105. See Gregory, supra note 103, at 3. 
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creasing budgetary pressures in 1982, however, Congress endeavored to 
diminish taxpayer support of Patent Office activities. Although public 
revenue continued to fund such Patent Office divisions such as legislative 
and international affairs, applicant fees were significantly increased in 
order to cover all application processing expenses.106 Patent Office fee 
revenues first made their way to the Treasury, but Congress annually ap-
propriated all of the collected monies back to the Patent Office.107 
Congress again altered the Patent Office fee schedule in the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. That legislation created a fee 
surcharge, amounting to an increase of approximately sixty-seven per-
cent over previous levels, intended to make the Patent Office wholly user 
funded. lOs Congress called for the income from the Patent Office sur-
charge to flow to a discrete Treasury accountYl9 Although Congress ini-
tially gave all of the surcharge fund back to the Patent Office, the fund 
proved an increasingly attractive source of revenue throughout the 
1990's.IIO By the time the surcharge scheme expired in 1998, Congress 
had diverted over $234 million in Patent Office fees to other government 
programs. III 
Although many in the patent community lauded the end of the sur-
charge, this event led only to more ingenious legislative accounting 
mechanisms for diverting Patent Office fees. During the 2000 fiscal year, 
for example, Congress placed a ceiling of $775 million upon the amount 
of fee revenue that the Patent Office may spend.1I2 This sum is approxi-
mately $290 million less than expected Patent Office revenues.1I3 Al-
though some of this shortfall may be reallocated to the Patent Office dur-
ing the 2001 fiscal year, Congress appears poised both to limit such 
reallocations and to place more aggressive budgetary ceilings upon the 
Patent Office in the near futureY4 Numerous Patent Office programs 
have inevitably suffered from these budgetary setbacks. The Patent Of-
fice has identified such programs as the expansion of prior art databases, 
quality assurance, and the hiring and training of examiners as deleteri-
ously impacted by miserly financial policies. I IS 
Among the treasured anecdotes of the U.S. patent system is the 
survival of the Patent Office during the 1814 sack of Washington, D.C. 
Following the British assault on Washington, D.C., the only significant 
public building to survive was Blodgett's Hotel, home of the Patent Of-
106. Seeid. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 2, 3. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 4. 
113. See id. 
114. See PTO Appropriations Cut, Fee Diversion Raises Ire of PTO and IP Community, 60 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 135 (2000). 
115. Seeid. at 136. 
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ficeY6 The forbearance of the British army has been owed to the impas-
sioned pleas of a Dr. William Thornton, who argued that the pillaging of 
the Patent Office would be akin to the destruction of the ancient Library 
at Alexandria.117 Regrettably, congressional financial authorities have 
shown considerably less restraint than did the British that day. 
In combination with the declining significance of the utility and 
statutory subject matter requirements, meager Patent Office funding has 
had a felt impact upon patent quality. Observers have reported that an 
increasingly high percentage of issued patents appropriate concepts that 
previously entered the public domainYs A common parlor trick at intel-
lectual property conferences is to display the latest issued patent that 
cites only a modest number of prior art references. The next slide in-
variably demonstrates a wholly anticipatory reference from a widely cir-
culated source. 
Persistent commentary also reports that the Patent Office has in-
creasingly relied upon previously issued patents as prior art. 1l9 Newly 
granted patents stress the citation of prior art patents, with diminished 
reference to such secondary literature as texts and journal articles yo 
Tight examiner schedules appear to be the chief cause of this circum-
scribed searching strategy. In comparison to much of the secondary lit-
erature, patents are readily accessible, conveniently classified and printed 
in a common format. Identification of a promising secondary reference, 
and full comprehension of its contents, often prove to be more difficult 
tasks. 
A prior art search focused upon granted patents may not be entirely 
objectionable in fields in which patents have been traditionally sought. 
Patents provide a robust prior art database in many disciplines. As well, 
a virtue of the nonobviousness standard is that an examiner need not lo-
cate the ideal anticipatory prior art reference in order to reject an appli-
cation over the state of the art. Several related references may provide a 
view of public domain knowledge sufficient to generate a valid rejection. 
Overreliance upon patents as indicia of the state of the art works far 
more mischief in fields long believed to be outside the patent system, 
however. For software, business methods, and other postindustrial in-
ventions, the repository of issued patents insufficiently samples the prior 
art. Examiners who primarily rely upon the patent literature to generate 
116. See Whit Cobb, Democracy in Search of Utopia: The History, Law and Politics of Relocating 
the National Capital, 99 DICK. L. REV. 527,551 (1995). 
117. See KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT 
OFFICE 64~6 (1997). 
118. See Andy Johnson-Laird, Looking Forward, Legislating Backward?, 4 J. SMALL & EMERG· 
ING Bus. L. 95, 120 (2000); Wayne M. Kennard, Software Patents As a Weapon: Are You Ready to 
Rumble?, in 19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 1123, 1135 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 547, 1999). 
119. See Kennard, supra note 118, at 1135. 
120. Seeid. 
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prior art in these fields are quite likely to allow patents to issue based 
upon information already within the public domain. Even those diligent 
examiners who consult the nonpatent literature might be limited to a 
sparse prior art collection. Because the patentability of business meth-
ods was unclear prior to the Federal Circuit's State Street Bank121 deci-
sion, for example, the Patent Office has yet to develop a comprehensive 
library of prior art business materials.122 
Some commentators have suggested that these problems are merely 
transitional in character.123 Under this view, Patent Office examiners will 
be able to climb the learning curve of business methods patents over 
time, just as they have with new technologies in the past. l24 However, 
prior art within disciplines newly opened to patenting may prove to be 
more elusive than traditionally patentable inventions. Business practices 
are discerned by observing the conduct of commercial enterprises, rather 
than by reading technical publications.125 The norms of the scientific 
community, which call for disclosure and peer review of advances, are 
not necessarily shared by the commercial sector. Of course, while such 
practices comprise prior art,126 they are not readily located by Patent Of-
fice examiners. 
Longstanding limitations upon Patent Office resources have re-
sulted in the issuance of invalid patents before. In many cases, the Pat-
ent Office error is harmless. Many patents claim inventions that nobody 
seriously intends to commercialize.127 Scorched earth prior art searches 
for recently issued patents on a motorized ice cream cone,128 hyper-light-
speed antenna,129 and a method of exercising a cat,130 for example, were 
unlikely to present an efficient use of Patent Office resources. 
Considerable social costs may attend the improvident issuance of 
many patents, however. Industry participants may be forced to expend 
considerable sums litigating or licensing invalid patents. Others may 
avoid market or research activities out of recognition of the vagaries of 
litigation results and the possibility of infringement liability. Attracted 
by large damages awards and loose Patent Office standards, rent-seeking 
121. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
122. See Jenna Green, Staking a Claim, LEGAL TIMES IP MAG., Apr. 10,2000, at 14. 
123. See John Schwartz, Online Patents to Face Tighter Review, WASH. POST, Mar. 30,2000, at E1. 
124. See id. 
125. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPo & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 269 (2000). 
126. See 35 U.S.c. § 102 (1994). 
127. A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of Computer 
Programs, 72 NEB. L. REv. 351, 426 (1993) ("[MJany patented inventions are never marketed for con-
sumption."). 
128. U.S. Patent No. 5,971,829 (issued Oct. 26, 1999). 
129. U.S. Patent No. 6,025,810 (issued Feb. 15,2000). 
130. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (issued Aug. 22, 1995). 
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entrepreneurs may divert resources from productive activities into specu-
lative patent acquisition and enforcement ventures.13l 
The stakes may be even higher for patents in the areas of business 
methods and software.!32 Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has observed that 
business method and data transformation patents concern information 
rather than industrial products.133 Such products tend to exhibit lock-in 
and network externalities. 134 Lock-in occurs when consumers face high 
costs in switching from one brand of technology to another.135 Network 
externalities result from a situation of positive feedback, where the value 
of connecting to a network depends upon the number of other people 
also connected to that network. Applied to economic competition, the 
typical result of network effects is a monopolistic, winner-take-all mar-
ket. Telephony and computer operating systems present examples of 
markets with network externalities.136 
These economic characteristics of information products suggest that 
software and business method patents need not be considered valid for 
very long in order to have substantial market impact.137 Suppose, for ex-
ample, that an Internet-based electronic retailer obtains a patent on a 
method of ordering merchandise, conducting an auction or enlisting as-
sociated retailers. Such patents may be invalid because they merely 
claim obvious electronic variants of well-known commercial activities. 
However, competitors of the patentee may face delays of several years as 
they seek to strike down such patents. Indeed, the high costs of patent 
litigation may discourage other retailers from challenging a patent at 
all. 138 As a result, competitors of the patentee may be discouraged from 
engaging in the patented method. Consumers who wish to take advan-
tage of the patented business features must then transact with the pat-
entee. 
The resulting market distortions may be significant. Familiarity 
with the patentee's website may encourage consumers to maintain com-
mercial relationships with the patentee, even if competitive web sites later 
131. See Merges, supra note 5, at 592. 
132. Improvidently granted patents may also have a disproportionate impact upon the pharma-
ceutical industry. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Food and Drug Administration may not ordi-
narily issue marketing approval of an abbreviated new drug application for thirty months following the 
commencement of patent enforcement litigation. See The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(C), 
G)(5)(B)(iii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998». This provision effectively grants a drug patent owner a thirty-
month preliminary injunction without any judicial assessment of the enforceability of the patent. See 
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Use-
fulness?, 39 IDEA 398 (1999). 
133. See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 271. 
134. CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 103-04, 173-75 (1999). 
135. See id. at 104. 
136. Seeid.at174-75. 
137. See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 271-72. 
138. See id. at 270. 
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enter the market. For example, Professor Dreyfuss observes that once 
consumers have entered their name, address, and billing information into 
a patentee's website, they may be reluctant to engage in the same tedious 
task with another Internet retailer.139 As a result, the consumer is locked 
into the website of the patentee even if the patent is later invalidated. 
Network effects may also playa role here. Internet retailers often 
analyze the information they receive from consumers in order to predict 
additional products individual consumers might enjoy. The accuracy of 
these predictions depends in part upon the number of consumers. Thus, 
the larger the network of consumers who patronize a particular website, 
the more valuable it is to patronize that website. l40 Internet auction 
houses operate more effectively with more prospective sellers and bid-
ders available. In sum, patent rights, even ones of dubious validity and 
limited lifespan, appear to accelerate the anticompetitive aspects of in-
formation products. 
Traditional technologies often exhibit lock-in and network effects as 
well. The role of information economics should not be overstressed in 
this context. A leading Supreme Court patent case from the nineteenth 
century, the Telephone141 case, was perhaps the fountainhead of the Bell 
monopoly. The Patent Office could rely upon its expertise with prede-
cessor electrical circuitry when considering this technology, however. 
Today examiners are confronted with inventions from the law, psychol-
ogy, insurance, and other disciplines that are neither technological nor 
the subject of any Patent Office experience.142 The current fiscallimita-
tions upon the Patent Office are also without precedent. It is this combi-
nation of forces that has placed increasing stress upon our patent system. 
The patent quality crisis is worthy of our attention. The market im-
pact of business method patents alone has yet to be quantitatively as-
sessed, but decisions such as Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com sug-
gest staggering possibilities.143 In that case Amazon.com obtained a 
patent claiming a method of ordering merchandise on the Internet with a 
single action, such as one click of a mouse button. Yet anyone who has 
walked into a bar, been spotted by a familiar bartender, and placed an 
order along with a request to "Put it on my tab!" seems to have engaged 
in one-click ordering. Amazon.com's patent rights nonetheless resulted 
in the award of a preliminary injunction against a major competitor on 
the eve of an all-important holiday shopping season. 
139. See id. at 271. 
140. See id. 
141. See Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1887). 
142. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 1163. 
143. 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999). The Federal Circuit subsequently vacated the pre-
liminary injunction in Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc, No. 00-1109 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 
2(01). The Federal Circuit concluded that Barnesandnoble.com had mounted a substantial challenge 
to the validity of the one-click patent. Although the Federal Circuit reached the appropriate result, it 
is regrettable that an improvidently issued patent afforded Amazon.com the benefit of an improvi-
dently granted injunction for fourteen months and the passing of two holiday shopping seasons. 
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Amazon.com suggests the deleterious consequences associated with 
the appropriation of computerized versions of familiar business activities. 
Commentators have passionately urged that the patenting of electronic 
commerce patents runs counter to norms of open access to the Inter-
net. l44 Concern that the principal tools of the Internet economy will be 
appropriated by a few has also led to predictions of diminished competi-
tion in online commerce.145 
Another worrisome trend is that public perception of the patent sys-
tem is in a rapid tailspin. Citing proprietary rights in electronic com-
merce concepts such as the one-click patent, major newspapers and 
magazines have once more found the patent system a convenient target 
of scathing criticism.146 Amazon.com itself faced public protest and talk 
of a boycott following its successful patent enforcement exercise.147 Con-
ciliatory statements by Amazon.com CEO and Time Magazine 1999 Per-
son of the Year Jeffrey Bezos dampened this movement,t48 but his re-
marks appear to have set another sequence of events into motion. By 
suggesting that the patent law be modified to account for software and 
business methods,149 Bezos has renewed vigorous discussion over the 
substance and procedure of contemporary patent law. This article next 
considers the modern patent law reform movement, identifying and ana-
lyzing some of the more significant proposals. 
IV. A REVIEW OF PREVAILING PATENT REFORM PROPOSALS 
With the patent system plumbing depths not seen since the Great 
Depression, a surfeit of proposals have emerged for solving the current 
troubles of the patent system. The Patent Office itself has launched a 
multifaceted Business Methods Patent Initiative aimed at improving pat-
ent quality. Academic journals and the lay press alike have offered more 
dramatic measures meant to improve upon patent acquisition and en-
forcement. This part offers a critical review of the more popular reform 
proposals on the table, with emphasis upon the most popular of the lot, 
the opposition. 
144. See Tim O'Reilly, My Conversation with Jeff Bezos, at http://www.Oreilly.comlask_tim.html 
(Mar. 2, 2(00) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). 
145. See Lawrence Lessig, The Problem with Patents, THE INDUS. STANDARD, at 
http://www.thestandard.comlarticie/display/0.1151.4296.00.html (April 23, 1999) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review). 
146. See Jan Muehlbauer, Patent Pundits on Parade, THE INDUS. STANDARD, at 
http://www.thestandard.comlarticie/display/0.1151.13019.00.html (Mar. 16,2000) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Illinois Law Review). 
147. See Richard M. Stallman, Boycott Amazon!, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, at 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/amazon.html (last updated June 15,2000) (on file with the University 
of Illinois Law Review). 
148. Jeff Bezos, An Open Letter from Jeff Bezos on the Subject of Patent, at http://www.amazon 
.comlexedobidos/substlmisc/patents.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with the University of 
Illinois Law Review). 
149. See id. 
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A. The Initiative and Related Reform Proposals 
On the heels of a congressional oversight hearing that called the 
quality of business methods patents into question, the Patent Office on 
March 29,2000, launched a "Business Methods Patent Initiative."15o Ac-
cording to the Patent Office, the Initiative will "ensure that patents 
granted for software-implemented business methods are of the highest 
quality and benefit to the growing electronic commerce industry."151 The 
Initiative includes an industry-outreach component in which the Patent 
Office pledges to solicit industry input, convene a roundtable forum, and 
establish a formal customer partnership with the software, Internet, and 
electronic commerce industries regarding business method patents.152 
The Initiative also includes measures designed to improve patent 
quality. The Patent Office has committed to provide enhanced technical 
training for examiners, with particular emphasis upon practices in bank-
ing, finance, electronic commerce, insurance, and Internet infrastruc-
ture.153 The Patent Office will also mandate a more strict prior art search 
for business method patent applications, including the requirement that 
examiners review specified secondary literature.154 The Initiative also 
provides for second-level review of all business method patent applica-
tions that have been prelimin·arily approved.155 Finally, the Patent Office 
will gauge its progress by placing additional business method patent ap-
plications before its quality-review personneU56 
The responsiveness of Patent Office management to business 
method patent quality problems is commendable. Whether the Initiative 
will result in improved electronic commerce patents remains to be seen, 
however. If pertinent prior art is not accessible to examiners, either be-
cause the Patent Offic.e has not gathered the reference or because it has 
not been journalized, then expanded searching will be pointless.157 The 
Patent Office also possesses finite resources. Heightened Patent Office 
review of one class of inventions will result in diminished oversight of 
other inventions for which patents are sought.158 
150. See U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property 
Dickinson Unveils New Initiative Focusing on Business Methods Patents, at http://www.uspto.gov/web 
loffices/corn/speeches/00-22.htm (Mar. 30, 2000) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review); 
see also Geneva Sapp, Net Patents Process Receives an Overhaul, INFOWORLD, Apr. 13,2000, at 8. 
151. U.S. Patent Trademark Office, supra note 150. 
152. See id. 
153. See U.S. Patent Trademark Office, Business Methods Patent Initiative: An Action Plan, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn/sol/actionplan.html(Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with the University 




157. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
158. See Victoria Slind-F1or, Business Patents Get 2d Look: But Critics Assert That PTO's New 
Policies Won't Solve Problems, 22 NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 2000, at B6. 
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Stepping beyond the Initiative, commentators have urged additional 
investments in patent quality. Among the more frequently mentioned 
proposals call for the hiring of additional examiners and, by raising sala-
ries, retention of experienced examiners.159 These proposals tend toward 
the impractical given the financial distress in which the Patent Office 
finds itself. A further difficulty is that despite its current budgetary mal-
aise, the Patent Office has already engaged in aggressive hiring efforts. 
In fiscal year 1998, the Patent Office hired 728 examiners, followed by 
the hiring of an additional 801 examiners in 1999.160 The majority of the 
novice examiners were assigned to examine electrical and computer-
related inventions.161 
The result of these extraordinary hiring efforts is that the group of 
examiners most likely to encounter business method patent applications 
possesses only modest experience. At least in the short term, the impact 
of this employment campaign upon patent quality will likely have been 
negative. The burden of training and supervising so many new hires may 
have detracted from examination efforts at a time when so many new 
disciplines have come under the wing of the patent law. 
The severe shortage of individuals with high technology skills in the 
domestic workforce suggests that the Patent Office will not be able to 
maintain this pace. One industry association estimates that U.S. compa-
nies would fill less than half of their 1.6 million job vacancies involving 
technical skills during the 2000 calendar year.162 The Microsoft Corpora-
tion alone possessed sufficient job openings during the 2000 calendar 
year to hire the entire corps of 3200 Patent Office examiners.163 Unfor-
tunately, the mere authorization of additional examiner positions does 
not mean that qualified individuals will be available to fill these posts, or 
that the Patent Office will be able to train them without diminishing its 
own search and examination capabilities. 
Other commentators have called for changes in the examiner 
docket management system. Patent Office management tracks examiner 
workloads by crediting either a first action on the merits or a disposal of 
the application. Disposal counts are generally awarded either for the al-
lowance or abandonment of the application. l64 Noticeably absent from 
the list of ways to obtain a disposal count is continued rejection of the 
application. Additionally, Patent Office practice requires that examiners 
articulate their reasons for a rejection, while most often examiners need 
say nothing if they chose to allow a case. The belief is widely held that 
159. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 1. SMALL & 
EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 147 (2000); Merges, supra note 5, at 606-D7. 
160. See Kisliuk & Marshall, supra note 72, at 18. 
161. See id. 
162. See Marc BaIlon, U.S. High· Tech Jobs Going Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2000, at C1. 
163. See id. 
164. E.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING, supra note 80, § 711.04(a)-(c), at 700-104 to 700·105. 
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this regime encourages examiners to allow rather than to reject applica-
tions. 165 
Although this point is well taken, a review of earlier Patent Office 
management practices suggests that other possible methodologies have 
worked even less well. The current disposition point system actually 
arose from earlier regimes that awarded disposal points to examiners 
based merely upon the drafting of an Office Action. A common criticism 
of this system was that examiners were loathe to be rid of a particular 
application once they had taken the time to understand the technology 
and the claimed subject matter. Piecemeal rejections, elongated prosecu-
tions and so-called submarine patents were the typical result. l66 The cur-
rent system marks an effort to bring closure to prosecution in a more 
timely fashion. 
Perhaps the current disposal count system has been all too success-
ful, but the details of examiner docket management may have only a sec-
ondary impact upon allowance rates at the Patent Office. Long-
established practice places the burden of persuasion and initial burden of 
production upon examiners to generate rejections.167 Otherwise the ap-
plication must be allowed. The alternative possibility, requiring that ap-
plicants argue unknown and possibly unknowable objections to the pat-
ent, seems both unworkable and contrary to the Patent Act. l68 Disposal 
point specifics may not loom particularly large in the face of an institu-
tional framework that defaults towards allowance of a patent application. 
Another possibility is that the Patent Office should devote more ex-
amination resources to those patent applications that claim commercially 
valuable inventions. The task of identifying the marketplace worth of 
innovations appears quite difficult to achieve in practice.169 The inven-
tion that seems the most capable is not always the marketplace winner,17o 
and technological capabilities may change dramatically over the twenty-
year patent term. The result is a longstanding Patent Office policy of 
conducting an equally comprehensive 'prior art search for each submitted 
application, 
A final, persistent patent reform proposal calls for augmentation of 
the applicant duty of disclosure , 171 Rule 56 currently calls for applicants 
165, See Merges, supra note 5, at 609 (referring to disposal counts as "bonus points"), 
166. Interview with Mr, Ronald J, Stern, President of the Patent Office Professional Association, 
in Arlington, Va, (June 29, 2000), 
167, See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed, Cir, 1992) (Plager, J" concurring), 
168. See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed, CiT. 1994) (Plager, J" concurring); In re Oetiker, 
977 F.2d at 1449, 
169. See Merges, supra note 5, at 596-97. 
170. E.g" JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE AND THE ON-
SLAUGHT OF THE VCR 3()4...11 (1987) (discussing how Sony's Betamax, although originally termed the 
"ultimate" consumer electronics product, lost in the marketplace to the VCR), 
171. E.g., Donald S, Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Pro-
curement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Reform, 13 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH, LJ, 277, 318-19 (1997). 
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to disclose only relevant prior art of which they are aware.172 Many have 
found a mandated prior art search to be a straightforward way to solve 
patent quality problems.173 A principal difficulty with this proposal is 
that it would encourage applicants to submit the entirety of their search 
results. Rather than focusing attention on a handful of the most perti-
nent prior art, examiners would likely be overwhelmed with dozens of 
remote references. This sort of applicant sandbagging, already the sub-
ject of frequent complaints by examiners, seems most unlikely to im-
prove patent quality.174 
B. The Patent Opposition Panacea 
The Business Methods Patent Initiative and related proposals ap-
pear unlikely to contribute meaningfully to the solution of our current 
patent quality problems. Perhaps sensing the weaknesses of these pro-
posals, academic observers have increasingly encouraged private in-
volvement in Patent Office proceedings.175 These proposals typically call 
for either the augmentation of existing reexamination proceedings or 
wholesale adoption of opposition hearings based upon a European 
model. 
A feature of U.S. law since 1981, the reexamination statute allows 
any individual, including the patentee, a licensee, and even the Patent 
Office Director himself, to cite a prior art patent or printed publication 
to the Patent Office. If the Patent Office determines that this reference 
raises "a substantial new question of patentability" with respect to an is-
sued patent, then it will essentially renew prosecution of the issued pat-
ent.176 Traditional reexamination proceedings are conducted in an accel-
erated fashion on an ex parte basis, while a newly minted inter partes 
reexamination allows the requestor to participate more fully in the pro-
ceedings through the submission of argument and filing of appeals. I?? Ei-
ther sort of reexamination may result in a certificate confirming the pat-
172. See supra notes 87-88, 98 and accompanying text. 
173. See Brenda Sandburg, PTa's Destination: Silicon Valley, THE RECORDER (San Francisco), 
June 29, 1999. 
174. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
175. Writings favoring the adoption of expanded reexaminations or oppositions have not been 
limited to permanent members of law faculties. E.g., N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Reexamina-
tion: Recommendations for Change Based upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON 
L. REv. 945 (1993); Shannon M. Casey, Recent Development, the Patent Reexamination Reform Act of 
1994: A New Era of Third Party Participation, 2 J.INTELL. PRoP. L. 559 (1995); Nancy J. Linck et ai., 
A New Patent Examination Regime for a New Millennium, 35 Hous. L. REv. 305 (1998); Marvin Mot-
senbocker, Proposal to Change the Patent Reexamination Statute to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 
27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 887 (1994); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative 
Revocation of u.s. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition -and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HiGH TECH. L.J. 63 (1998). 
176. Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PRoP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 481, 487 (2000). 
177. See id. (quoting the language used in 35 U.S.c.A. § 312(a) (West Supp. 2000». 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  327 2001
No.1] A PROPOSAL FOR PATENT BOUNTIES 327 
entability of the original claims, an amended patent with narrower claims 
or a declaration of patent invalidity.178 
Congress intended reexamination to serve as an inexpensive alter-
native to judicial determinations of patent validity.179 The fees associated 
with reexamination are modest compared to patent litigation, which of-
ten runs into the millions of dollars. ISO Reexamination also allows further 
access to Patent Office technical expertise when additional prior art is 
discovered after issuance.181 
Reexamination presents a vitiated version of the opposition pro-
ceeding featured by many foreign patent systems.182 An opposition is a 
robust administrative revocation proceeding that may address a broad 
range of patentability issues.183 In further contrast to a reexamination, 
which is principally contested through written correspondence, the decla-
ration of an opposition may lead to full adversarial hearings conducted at 
the patent office.l84 
Most opposition systems concern granted patents and are therefore 
termed post-grant oppositions.l85 Post-grant oppositions must be filed in 
a timely fashion following patent issuance.l86 Other systems have pro-
vided for pre-grant oppositions that may be filed against pending patent 
applications.187 Statistics seem to show that foreign oppositions are more 
widely employed and more often result in findings of patent invalidity 
than domestic reexaminations. l88 
Any follower of recent academic writings on patents must be struck 
by the unanimity of support for the introduction of an opposition regime 
into U.S. law. In a recent article, Professor Merges identified oppositions 
as "the ideal solution" to problems of the contemporary patent system.189 
Professor Merges explained that the competitors of a patentee exhibit 
two virtues: they are the most interested individuals in the validity of the 
patent, and they tend to possess the most pertinent knowledge concern-
178. Seeid.at484-85. 
179. See Janis, supra note 8, at 36-38. 
180. See Steven J. Elleman, Problems in Patent Litigation: Mandatory Mediation May Provide 
Settlements and Solutions, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 759, 762-63 (1997). 
181. See Wayne O. Stacy, Note, Reexamination Reality: How Courts Should Approach a Motion 
to Stay Litigation Pending the Outcome of Reexamination, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 172,174-75 (1997). 
182. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 810; Symposium, Opposition Systems, 4 AM. INTELL. 
PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 92 (1976). 
183. E.g., European Patent Convention, Art. 100, reprinted in THE DRAFT EUROPEAN PATENT 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY WITH ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS (G. Oudemans ed., 1963). 
184. E.g., EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PAT· 
ENT OFFICE, pt. E, ch. III (1981). 
185. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 810. 
186. The European Patent Office accepts opposition filings within nine months from the date of 
the patent grant. See European Patent Convention, supra note 183, art. 99. In Germany oppositions 
must be filed within three months from the date the patent issues. See Ernst K. Pakuscher, Patent Pro-
cedures in the Federal Republic of Germany, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 86, 94 (1986). 
187. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 810. 
188. See Merges, supra note 5, at 612-13. 
189. [d. at 614. 
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ing the validity of the patent.l90 According to Professor Merges, opposi-
tions provide an optimal mechanism for stakeholders to disclose patent 
validity information as early as possible.191 
Professor Dreyfuss has also spoken favorably upon the expansion of 
post-grant proceedings in the context of business method patents. In tes-
timony before Congress, Professor Dreyfuss explained that the presump-
tion of validity attached to an issued business method patent may be too 
weighty in light of Patent Office examination difficulties. l92 Reflecting 
earlier work that reached a similar conclusion,t93 she suggested that Con-
gress adopt oppositions or expanded reexaminations in order to resolve 
business method patent quality problems.194 
Professor Reichman has lent an international perspective to this 
discussion. Offering suggestions to developing nations that hope to bal-
ance treaty obligations with domestic development goals, he favors the 
limitation of proprietary interests held by distant, foreign owners. Ac-
cording to Professor Reichman, oppositions are a "uniformly advisable" 
mechanism for nations with nascent patent systems to curb issued pat-
ents.195 
Professor Janis too has urged the adoption of a robust administra-
tive patent revocation system.1% Relying upon a thorough historical and 
comparative analysis, Professor Janis found reexamination inappropri-
ately oriented towards the correction of invalid patents. Instead, he sug-
gested that the patent law offer a valid alternative to litigation by means 
of an opposition. Professor Janis proposed that oppositions involve lib-
eral standing requirements, broad substantive scope and use of an expert 
panel.l97 
Enriched by both economic insights and empirical research, Profes-
sor Nard has also argued in favor of oppositions.198 According to Profes-
sor Nard, the interests of patentee, competitor, and the public alike favor 
certainty in the allocation of proprietary rights. l99 Only when patent 
rights are known with some confidence will individuals go about improv-
ing upon and inventing around the patented invention. Professor Nard 
190. See id. at 615. 
191. See id. 
192. Before Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of House Comm on Judiciary, 106th 
Congo (Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Professor of Law, New York University 
School of Law), available at 2000 WL 282803. 
193. See id. 
194. Before Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of House Comm on Judiciary, l06th 
Congo (Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Professor of Law, New York University 
School of Law), available at 2000 WL 282803. 
195. Reichman, supra note 8, at 31. 
196. See Janis, supra note 8, at 118-22. 
197. See id. at 118. 
198. See Nard, supra note 8, at 759. 
199. See id. at 759-60. 
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explained that oppositions further this goal by promoting proprietary 
and competitive certainty ex ante.2oo 
Professor Nard further revealed a favorable posture towards oppo-
sitions among the judiciary. His survey of federal district court judges 
showed that a plurality favored the implementation of a post-grant oppo-
sition proceeding.201 Industry observers and members of the bar appear 
of like mind. Representative is Amazon.com's Jeff Bezos, who suggested 
that the Patent Office provide for pre-grant oppositions prior to the issu-
ance of a business method or software patent.202 The two major societies 
of intellectual property professionals, the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association and American Bar Association's Section on Intellectual 
Property Law, have also adopted resolutions supporting oppositions.203 
Although each of these sources contained its own thoughtful analy-
sis, they shared the central assertion that we can solve our patent quality 
problems by designing an efficient and inexpensive opposition proceed-
ing. Once streamlined revocation procedures are set into place, we are 
told, private parties will be stimulated to bring the most pertinent prior 
art references to the attention of the Patent Office. The result will be 
better informed decision making, improved patent quality, and a re-
stored patent system. 
The conventional wisdom may soon leave its mark on U.S. patent 
law. On October 3, 2000, the Honorable Howard Berman introduced 
H.R. 5364 on the floor of the House of Representatives.204 Entitled the 
Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 5364 would for 
the first time introduce oppositions into the U.S. patent law.205 Although 
this legislation limits oppositions to patent applications claiming business 
methods, the grounds for opposition essentially include all substantive 
bases for patentability.206 
The general acknowledgment of the wisdom of oppositions is strik-
ing. Perhaps even more conspicuous, however, is the persistence of such 
proposals in the face of considerable experience suggesting that they will 
be of little consequence in the United States. A post-grant opposition is 
at bottom a more robust version of the reexamination, which stands as 
one of the greatest failures of the modern patent system.207 In 1981, a 
time when far fewer patent applications were filed and issued than today, 
forecasters predicted the filing of as many as 3000 reexamination re-
quests per annum. In 1996, so far the banner year for the filing of reex-
200. See id. at 795. 
201. Seeid. at 796-800. 
202. See Bezos, supra note 148. 
203. See Nard, supra note 8, at 764 n.28. 
204. H.R. 5364, 106th Cong., (introduced by the Honorable Howard Berman on Oct. 3,2000). 
205. See id. § 3. 
206. Seeid. 
207. See Janis, supra note 8, at 93. 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  330 2001
330 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2001 
amination requests, a grand total of 418 were filed.208 The newly minted 
inter partes reexamination may prove even less popular, with commenta-
tors predicting that industry will make scant use of these proceedings.209 
Pre-grant oppositions also lack a firm footing. Pressures from u.s. 
industry were a key factor prompting the Japanese government to abol-
ish pre-grant oppositions.2l0 Domestically, the U.S. patent system still in-
cludes two mechanisms for challenging pending patent applications, each 
of which is used only rarely. The nearest analogy to a pre-grant opposi-
tion here, protests, allow individuals to submit prior art to the Patent Of-
fice. The protestor must specifically identify the application and offer a 
concise explanation of each submitted reference.211 
The Patent Office may also conduct public use proceedings against 
a pending patent application.212 Patent Office regulations allow individu-
als to submit affidavits and other evidence showing that the invention 
was on sale or in public use within the terms of § 102. If this evidence re-
sults in a prima facie case, the Patent Office may conduct hearings to de-
termine whether this use or sales activity amounts to prior art. Such a 
hearing may result in the submission of evidence and hearing of wit-
nesses. Like protests, the Patent Office need convene public use pro-
ceedings only on an infrequent basis.213 
Aware of the reluctance of potential patent opponents to employ 
reexaminations, protests, and public use proceedings, proponents of op-
positions often point to perceived deficiencies in these procedures. Un-
der this view, potential patent opponents are so discouraged by the in-
adequacies of current proceedings that they simply fail to step forward at 
all. These arguments are not without merit, for no Patent Office proce-
dure does or likely could substitute for judicial proceedings. Closer in-
spection suggests, however, that the noted procedural deficiencies do not 
fully explain the reticence of potential patent opponents. 
For example, commentators have turned to the traditional require-
ment that the Patent Office maintain applications in confidence as the 
reason that protests and public use proceedings are so infrequently em-
ployed. Observers have often suggested that individuals have simply 
been unaware of the patent applications filed by their competitors, and 
therefore simply have been unable to commence a protest or public use 
proceeding.214 This explanation rings rather hollow, however, for savvy 
competitors can often determine the contents of a domestic patent appli-
cation by consulting a foreign counterpart. If an inventor seeks patent 
208. Merges, supra note 5, at 610. 
209. See Janis, supra note 176, at 498-99. 
210. See Janis, supra note 8, at 116-17. 
211. See National Processing Provisions, Protests and Public Use Proceedings, 37 c.F.R. § 
1.291(b) (2000). 
212. See id. § 1.292(a). 
213. See Nard, supra note 8, at 764 n.27. 
214. See Janis, supra note 8, at 16; see also Nard, supra note 8, at 764 n.27. 
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protection both in a foreign country and the United States, the patent 
application will be published overseas eighteen months following the ear-
liest filing date. Competitors have the opportunity to inspect the foreign 
application and either see for themselves, or take a considerably edu-
cated guess 'at, the content of the U.S. application. At this point they 
could readily commence a protest or public use proceeding, but experi-
ence shows that they rarely do. 
Observers have also pointed to the restrictions placed upon the re-
examination proceeding as' compared to litigation. The Patent Act al-
lows a reexamination to be provoked solely due to prior art patents and 
printed publications that were not before the Patent Office during the 
original proceeding.215 Yet, as a practical matter, patents and printed 
publications remain the most accessible prior art for a would-be patent 
opponent.216 Further, the Federal Circuit has taken an expansive view of 
reexamination, at least once the reexamination has been properly de-
clared. Exemplary is In re Lonardo,217where the court held that double 
patenting was appropriately taken during reexamination. Given that 
double patenting rejections do not in any way concern the prior art, re-
examination may not be so limited as it initially appears. 
Another prominent criticism was that third parties play only a lim-
ited role in traditional ex parte reexaminations.218 Congress responded 
by enacting an inter partes reexamination with an expanded role for the 
third party requester.219 Observers have again predicted that industry 
will not make much use of inter partes reexaminations, however. Con-
cerned that inter partes examinations would be subject to abuse, Con-
gress mandated that an inter partes reexamination participant could not 
further challenge the reexamined patent based upon prior art that was, 
or should have been, before the PTO.220 According to critics, this preclu-
sive effect associated with inter partes reexaminations will severely chill 
their use.221 
If these accounts are to be believed, then the stewards of our patent 
system have suffered an incredible string of misfortunes. The entire 
menu of domestic patent challenges, including protests, public use pro-
ceedings, two varieties of reexaminations, and declaratory judgments in-
cludes not a single vehicle capable of animating would-be patent protes-
tors. Each sort of revocation procedure instead includes a unique, 
readily identifiable defect that almost wholly suppresses potential users. 
This view naturally leads to the conclusion that a more robust opposition 
exists in the European mode. Statistics seem to support this conclusion, 
215. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994); see also id. § 302. 
216. See id. § 102(a); see also supra text accompanying note 62. 
217. See 119 F.3d 960, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
218. See Janis, supra note 8, at 69-71. 
219. See Janis, supra note 176, at 482. 
220. See id. at 494. 
221. See id. at 492-98. 
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for they show that oppositions are subject to considerable greater use 
than the more limited proceedings extant in the United States.222 
European Patent Office oppositions have attracted their own share 
of critics, however. The number of contestable issues is limited in Mu-
nich as well.223 A lax procedural setting and concern over the impartiality 
of the adjudicators have also raised concems.224 European oppositions 
have been the subject of abuses and delaying tactics.225 For example, the 
inventors of the well-known Oncomouse filed a European patent appli-
cation in 1985.226 Years later, the patent remains the subject of seventeen 
oppositions filed by animal rights activists, environmentalists, and other 
groupS.227 
More significantly, higher European usage rates lack meaning 
within the context of the U.S. patent system. In Continental patent sys-
tems, an accused patent infringer may not assert an invalidity defense 
during enforcement litigation.228 Invalidity arguments may only be heard 
within an opposition or, once the deadline for an opposition has passed, a 
distinct nullity proceeding.229 Of course, where oppositions provide the 
principal mechanism for challenging patent validity, higher usage rates 
are inevitable. 
Critics of the various domestic proceedings for disputing issued pat-
ents offer many valid points. Yet the unpopularity of each of the prevail-
ing mechanisms for challenging U.S. patents is telling. We should recog-
nize the possibility that these low usage rates have resulted not from a 
series of particularized defects, but from more fundamental forces. 
Competitors of a patentee have been presumed to possess incentives to 
contest issued patents, but experience suggests that they often lack moti-
vation to take up a patent challenge of any stripe. A simpler, more per-
suasive explanation for this behavior results from a more thorough con-
sideration of whether private citizens possess incentives to clear the rolls 
of invalid patents to act in the public interest. This article next constructs 
this account and considers its ramifications for postindustrial patent re-
form. 
222. See Merges, supra note 5. at 612-14. 
223. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270; see also 
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 184, pI. D, ch. III, 'II 5, available at http://www.european-
patent-office.orgllegaVguUmesle/d_iii_5.htm (last updated July 27, 2000) ("The following allegations, 
for example, do not constitute grounds for opposition: that national rights of earlier date exist ... that 
the proprietor of the patent is not entitled to the European patent, that the subject·matter of the pat-
ent lacks unity, [and] that the claims are not supported by the description .... "). 
224. See Paul A. Coletti, No Relief in Sight: Difficulties in Obtaining Judgments in Europe Using 
EPO Issued Patents, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 351, 367-68 (1999). 
225. See id. at 354-57. 
226. See Simon Cohen, Focus: Intellectual Property: Unravelling Code of Genetic Patents, THE 
LAW., Sept. 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9168306. 
227. See id.; European Oncomouse Patent Opposed, 5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Mar. 1993, at 45. 
228. See Janis, supra note 8, at 109-10. 
229. See id. 
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C. Reexamining Patent Opposition Proceedings 
The patent law is often said to solve a problem of collective action. 
We suspect that inventions, like other public goods, will be underpro-
duced relative to social need. Society as a whole values inventions, but 
individuals lack private incentives to produce them due to their nonex-
clusive and nonrival traits. The patent system changes the rules of this 
production game by reducing the public goods characteristics of inven-
tions. The aim is to solve this market problem and stimulate the produc-
tion of inventions.z30 
These familiar teachings hold explanatory power in the context of 
patent challenges as well. A central point of this article is that a chal-
lenge to patent validity should also be recognized as involving collective 
action problems. By viewing patent challenges in this familiar light, we 
can both account for the sporadic use of reexaminations, protests, imd 
public use proceedings, and recognize that the adoption of oppositions is 
unlikely to solve our current patent quality problems. Our principal task 
should not be to remove procedural obstacles for would-be patent chal-
lengers, but to encourage individuals to oppose invalid patents in the first 
place. 
This analysis begins by recognizing that patent validity challenges 
exhibit the characteristics of pl,lblic goods. First, invalidated patents con-
vey benefits that are nonrival.231 The disclosure of an invalidated patent 
is ordinarily injected into the public domain. Like other sorts of informa-
tion, the invention may be freely used by all without detracting from the 
benefits of any. The potential benefits of a successful patent opposition 
are also nonexcludable.232 Patents are declared invalid for all purposes, 
not vis-a-vis a particular individual. A prevailing opponent of a patent 
therefore cannot prevent others from practicing the invention claimed in 
the invalidated patent. Others may readily free ride from the efforts of 
the former patentee and the opponent, employing the teachings of the 
invalidated patent to practice the invention without compensation to 
anyone. 
Although this result may seem intuitive, the nonexcludability of a 
successful charge of patent invalidity is a relatively recent development. 
As reflected by the 1936 Supreme Court decision in Triplett v. Lowell,233 
for many years an earlier declaration of patent invalidity did not prevent 
a patentee from filing infringement charges against a different defendant. 
Although criticized as relying upon the outmoded principle of mutuality 
of estoppel, the Triplett rule possessed the virtue of encouraging geo-
graphically dispersed individuals to mount their own patent challenges. 
230. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
233. 297 U.S. 638 (1936). 
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Other courts might find an earlier holding of invalidity persuasive, of 
course, but they were not bound by it. Secure that they alone would 
benefit from a favorable judgment, potential opponents of a patent were 
encouraged to take action. 
The Tripplet rule is no longer with us, for the Court's subsequent 
decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois 
Foundation overturned that case.234 Citing the public interest in efficient 
judicial administration and achieving a settled result on patent validity, 
the Court held that patentees were estopped from asserting patents that 
had been held invalid, even where another defendant had been the pre-
vailing party. Blonder-Tongue has attracted few critics over the years, 
but among its drawbacks is that a potential opponent cannot appropriate 
the benefits of a successful charge of patent invalidity to itself. In eco-
nomic terms, the benefits of a successful charge of patent invalidity be-
came nonexcludable. 
The identification of patent challenges as yielding benefits that are 
nonrival and nonexcludable brings certain insights. We can expect that 
patent challenges will be subject to collective action problems. The re-
sulting consumptive externalities should result in fewer patent challenges 
than are socially optimal, a recognition supported by our experience. 
The scant use of reexamination, protests, and public use proceedings in-
dicates that industry actors have not been sufficiently animated into chal-
lenging patents that should be brought down.235 
The recent episode involving the so-called Y2K windowing patent 
displays the depths of this collective action problem. In 1996, the Patent 
Office granted a patent on the use of so-called windowing techniques to 
solve computer errors associated with the close of the twentieth cen-
tury.236 During November 1999, its proprietor, Bruce Dickens, sent hun-
dreds of letters to leading companies with requests for royalty pay-
ments.237 The result was an industry uproar that made its way to the lay 
press.238 Commentators opined that the patent claimed technology that 
would have been obvious in light of techniques well known to the field of 
computer science.239 
On December 21,1999, a reexamination was provoked for the Y2K 
windowing patent. The defender of the public interest did not arise from 
the ranks of private industry, however, for the reexamination was sought 
234. 402 U.s. 313 (1971). 
235. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
236. U.S. Patent No. 5,630,118 (issued May 13, 1997). 
237. Dugie Standeford, PTO Orders Reexamination of Y2K Fix Patent, 222 THE LEGAL INTELLJ· 
GENCER, Jan. 7,2000, at 4. 
238. E.g., William Cray, Patented Y2K Fix in Review, THE PLAIN DEALER (Oeveland), Dec. 24, 
1999, at 3C; P.J. Huffstutler, Tech Beat: He Says He Patented a Y2K Cure, but Big Companies Aren't 
So Sure, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,2000, at Cl; Teresa Riordan, Y2K Quick-Fix Patent to Get Further Scru-
tiny, THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 1999, at 4. 
239. See Kevin Coughlin, Technology Upends the Meaning of Invention: Patent Requests Shift to 
Ideas, Know-How, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Mar. 12,2000, available at 2000 WL 15869531. 
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by the Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner himself?40 Amaz-
ingly, despite the extraordinary publicity and singular sense of industrial 
alarm, no individual, enterprise, or foundation led the charge to contest 
the Y2K windowing patent. The motivation of the Patent Office ap-
peared not so much as safeguarding the public, but shielding itself from 
ridicule resulting from its issuance of a plainly invalid patent.241 
Other Commissioner-requested reexaminations have followed a 
similar pattern.242 The central lesson from these experiences is that, as in 
other contexts, industrial actors often prefer to shirk than work. In addi-
tion to explaining current industry disinterest in disputing issued patents, 
this account holds a normative component. Opposition procedures now 
seem quite unlikely to stimulate private citizens to become champions of 
the public interest. Oppositions offer procedural conveniences, but they 
do not encourage patent challenges in the first place. The poverty of op-
position proposals suggests that other approaches may present more vital 
solutions to our patent quality problems. 
Recognition of the collective action problems inherent in patent 
challenges brings another insight from the economic literature. Patent 
challenges also appear laden with problems of collusion. The holder of 
patent-defeating prior art has two basic options: mount a validity chal-
lenge, or hold the reference in the hope of dealing with the patentee. 
The latter possibility might often be the more attractive one. Upon en-
countering an infringement charge, the competitor can privately disclose 
the prior art reference to the patentee. So long as sufficient supracom-
petitive profits exist to go around, the patentee ordinarily possesses in-
centives to suppress the prior art by means of a favorable license. Both 
parties may then extract information rents from the consuming public by 
maintaining artificially high prices due to an invalid patent.243 
This analysis may strike some readers as both speCUlative and rather 
cynical. Still, patentees from George Selden to Jerome Lemelson have 
long recognized that prospective licensees often prefer to pay a modest 
royalty rather than contest an invalid patent.244 The prospect of collusion 
has also received a thorough airing in the context of licensee estoppel. 
Casting doubt on the Supreme Court's view that licensees "may often be 
the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the 
patentability of an inventor's discovery,"245 Professor Dreyfuss has ex-
plained that the interests of patent licensees are often aligned with the 
240. See Standeford, supra note 237, at 4. 
241. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 808. 
242. See Terri Suzette Hughes, Comment, Patent Reexamination and the PTa: Compton's Patent 
Invalidated at the Commissioner's Request, 14 J. MARSHALLJ. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 379 (1996). 
243. See Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1198 
(1983). 
244. See Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend 
Around a Patent That a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 11, 
13-14,19-24 (1999); see also Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971). 
245. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653,670 (1969). 
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patent owner in seeking to maintain the validity of the patent.246 A licen-
see's successful patent challenge may only invite competition, with the 
prospect of increased production and diminished profitability. Expand-
ing upon the observation of Professor Dreyfuss, we need only appreciate 
that any holder of patent-defeating prior art is a potential licensee. 
Two additional episodes suggest that concerns over collusion are le-
gitimate. The first of these concern administrative proceedings termed 
"interferences." The Patent Office conducts interferences in order to de-
termine which of a set of competing individuals was the first inventor.247 
The Patent Act calls for only the first person to invent the subject matter 
of the interference to obtain the patent.248 The other parties to the inter-
ference potentially become infringers.249 
The Patent Office has recognized that the parties to an interference 
may possess incentives to enter into collusive agreements sharing patent 
rights.250 For example, the interfering applicants may discover prior art 
that would defeat the patent no matter which party is adjudicated the 
first inventor. Rather than expose an invalid patent, the parties to the 
interference may instead settle their dispute and enter into a licensing ar-
rangement.25J To ferret out such abuses, the Patent Act requires that 
copies of private agreements settling interferences be made available for 
public inspection.252 
A second example originates from the complex provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. The Hatch-Waxman Act governs the relationship 
between innovative pharmaceutical companies and their generic com-
petitors. Among its provisions is an incentive for generic drug manufac-
turers to challenge patents held by innovative pharmaceutical companies. 
The Act posts a reward to the first generic manufacturer to contest a 
drug patent. If that patent is struck down, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration may only grant marketing rights to the first generic challenger 
for alSO-day period.253 The intended effect of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was to provide to the successful generic manufacturer, in the words of the 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, an "Edenic moment of freedom" 
from competition.254 
246. See Dreyfuss, supra note 8. 
247. See 35 u.S.c. § 135(a) (1994). 
248. See id. 
249. Assuming that the losing party to the interference itself makes, uses, sells, offers to sell, or 
imports into the United States the patented invention. See 35 U.S.c. § 271(a). For a discussion of in-
terference proceedings, see Kevin McMahon, Patent Interferences: A Snare for the Unwary or a Ne-
glected Weapon?, 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS., June 1992, at 20. 
250. See Matthew B. Zisk, Mediation and Settlement of Patent Disputes in the Shadow of the Pub-
lic Interest, 14 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOLUTION 481,501-03 (1999). 
251. See id. 
252. See 35 U.S.c. § 135(c); 37 C.F.R. § 1.666 (1999). 
253. See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA's Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 195, 198-200 (1999). 
254. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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Instead of encouraging patent challenges and increasing public ac-
cessibility to generic drugs, however, experience shows that the 180-day 
exclusivity provision has tended to promote collusive activity between 
the patentee and first challenger. Although the Hatch-Waxman Act calls 
for a reward to the initial patent opponent, the statute does not require 
that the original challenger actually pursue the matter to final judgment. 
In practice, the more likely result is that the two parties enter into a cash 
settlement that can run into the millions of dollars.255 
With the first patent opponent allied with the patentee, the Hatch-
Waxman Act leads to the unusual result of discouraging further patent 
challenges. Even if a subsequent challenger manages to invalidate the 
patent during litigation, 180 days must pass before the FDA may grant 
the victorious party permission to market the drug. Further, the tardy 
challenger itself obtains no market exclusivity. As individuals seldom 
possess incentives to act as champions for the entire generic pharmaceu-
tical industry, Hatch-Waxman Act procedures have tended to bar rather 
than promote. the availability of generic drugs.256 
This experience with interferences and the Hatch-Waxman Act 
should promote a more general wariness of collusive behavior between 
patentees and potential patent challengers. One need not have mastered 
the political economy of patent challenges to sense that private dealing 
often presents a more attractive option than disputing a patent grant. 
Opposition proposals do nothing to alter this fundamental set of incen-
tives, leaving little reason to suspect that they will somehow invigorate 
the active pruning of invalid patents from the public rolls. 
Problems of collusion and collective action potentially apply to any 
sort of patent. In the area where patent quality problems seem most 
acute, business methods, the incentives to challenge patents are even fur-
ther diminished. Among the titles of the American Inventors Protection 
Act of 1999 is the First Inventor Defense Act, which creates a personal 
infringement defense for a prior inventor of a business method that is 
later patented by another.257 By providing those enterprises best able to 
mount a successful patent challenge with a more attractive option, Con-
gress has dealt another setback to the public interest in eliminating inva-
lid patents. 
255. One recent incident involved the antihyperintensive drug Hytrin. In early 1998, the pat-
entee, Abbott Laboratories, agreed to pay two potential competitors a total of $6.5 million per month 
in exchange for their promise not to produce a generic version of Hytrin. The parties cancelled their 
deals upon facing an investigation from the competition authorities. Hytrin's generic equivalent, tera-
zosin, at last made its market debut in August 1999. Similar arrangements have been documented 
with respect to such patented drugs as tamoxifen, Cardizem CD, K-DUr, Cipro, and diltiazem. See 
Engelberg, supra note 132, at 416-18; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Deals to Keep Ge-
neric Drugs Off Market Under Scrutiny: Pharmaceutical Firms Have Become Aggressive About Fend-
ing Off Competition as Drug Patents Expire, THE OREGONIAN, July 23, 2000, at A05. 
256. Engelberg, supra note 132, at 422-25. 
257. First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4302, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.c.A. § 273 (West 2000». 
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The impetus for First Inventor Defense Act bears a brief explana-
tion.258 This statute reflects the complex relationship between the law of 
trade secrets and the patent system. Trade secrecy protects individuals 
from misappropriation of valuable information that is useful in com-
merce. Individuals might maintain an invention as a trade secret due to 
ignorance of the patent system, or because they are unable to bear costly 
patent acquisition expenses. Inventors might also believe they can keep 
their invention as a secret longer than the period of exclusivity granted 
through the patent system.259 
Although many individuals opt to maintain their inventions as trade 
secrets, the patent system has not favored them.260 Well-established pat-
ent law provides that an inventor who makes a secret, commercial use of 
an invention for more than one year prior to filing a patent application at 
the PTO forfeits his own right to a patent.261 This policy is principally 
based upon the desire to maintain the integrity of the statutory pro-
scribed patent term. The patent law grants patents a term of twenty 
years, commencing from the date a patent application is filed.262 If the 
trade secret holder could make commercial use of an invention for many 
years before choosing to file a patent application, he could disrupt this 
regime by delaying the expiration date of his patent. 
On the other hand, settled patent law principles established that 
prior secret uses would not defeat the patents of later inventors.263 If an 
earlier inventor made secret commercial use of an invention, and another 
person independently invented the same technology later and obtained 
patent protection, then the trade secret holder could face liability for 
patent infringement. This policy was based upon the reasoning that is-
sued, published patent instruments fully inform the public about the in-
vention, while trade secrets do not. As between a subsequent inventor 
who patented the invention, and thus had disclosed the invention to the 
public, and an earlier trade secret holder who had not, the law favored 
the patent holder. 
The sudden patentability of methods of doing business has focused 
attention upon the relationship between patents and trade secrets. In-
ventors of methods of doing business traditionally relied upon trade se-
cret protection because such inventions had long been regarded as un-
patentable subject matter. As a result, inventors of innovative business 
methods obtained legal advice not to file applications at the PTO on 
258. See generally James R. Barney, The Prior User Defense: A Reprieve for Trade Secret Owners 
or a Disaster for the Patent Law?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 261 (2000) (critiquing the 
First Inventor Defense Act of 1999). 
259. David D. Friedman et aI., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 1. EcoN. PERSP. 61, 63 
(1991). 
260. See loan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 1081, 1120-22. 
261. See Metallizing Eng'g, Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (1946). 
262. See 35 U.S.c. § 154(a)(2) (1994). 
263. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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their inventions. This advice was sound under the patent law as it then 
stood. 
By altering this traditional principle, State Street Bank was perceived 
as harming earlier inventors of business methods. Many of these inven-
tors had maintained their innovative business methods as trade secrets 
for many years. As a result, they were unable belatedly to obtain patent 
protection on their business methods. As well, because trade secrets did 
not constitute prior art against the patent applications of others, a subse-
quent inventor would be able to obtain patent protection. Under these 
circumstances, a trade secret holder could find himself an adjudicated in-
fringer of a patented business method that he actually invented first. 264 
The First Inventor Defense Act reconciles these principles by pro-
viding an infringement defense for an earlier inventor of a method of do-
ing business that was later patented by another. This infringement de-
fense is personal to a previous inventor and is subject to several 
qualifications.265 First, the defendant must have reduced the infringing 
subject matter to practice at least one year before the effective filing date 
of the application.266 Second, the defendant must have commercially 
used the infringing subject matter prior to the effective filing date of the 
patent.267 Finally, any reduction to practice or use must have been made 
in good faith,268 without derivation from the patentee or persons in priv-
ity with the patentee.269 
The First Inventor Defense Act expressly states that patents shall 
not be held invalid under section 102 or 103 because the first inventor de-
fense is raised or established.270 Many entities that qualify for the first in-
ventor defense have likely engaged in patent-defeating acts as well, how-
ever. As a result, accused infringers who previously would have raised 
invalidity defenses may now opt to assert the first inventor defense in-
stead. It is easy to imagine circumstances when they will chose the latter, 
thereby retaining an invalid patent on the books at the expense of their 
competitors. 
Suppose, for example, that the Sigil Bank and Trust Company re-
duced to practice an innovative method of managing an investment port-
folio on December 27,1997. Sigil maintained its method as a trade secret 
and put it into commercial use as of October 12,1999. Sigillater learned 
that one of its employees had disclosed the invention in a letter sent to 
several individual investors on January 19, 1999. Sigil disciplined the 
employee but remained confident that the recipients of the letters would 
not perceive the value of the invention. 
264. See Thomas, supra, note 6, at 32 n.156. 
265. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(b)(6) (West Supp. 2000). 
266. See id. § 273(b)(1). 
267. See id. 
268. See id. 
269. See id. § 273(b)(3)(B) .. 
270. See id. § 273(b )(9). 
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Subsequently, an independent inventor named Jack Chalker inde-
pendently conceived of the same business method. Chalker filed a pat-
ent application on June 1, 2000, disclosing and claiming the identical 
method of managing of an investment portfolio. The patent issued on 
November 1, 2001, at which time Chalker filed an infringement suit 
against Sigil. 
Prior to the First Inventor Defense Act, Sigil would likely contend 
that the Chalker patent was invalid due to the errant employee letters. 
Provided that the letters provide an enabling disclosure of the patented 
business method, they should prove patent defeating.271 Today, Sigil 
would find assertion of the first inventor defense more advantageous. 
Sigil would merely demonstrate its dates of reduction to practice and 
commercial use without necessarily disclosing its letters to the court. A 
core benefit of this tactic is that Sigil need not share the benefits of as-
serting the defense with others in the financial services industry. The 
first inventor defense is personal,272 and as Chalker does not himself prac-
tice the invention on a commercial scale Sigil need not be concerned with 
him. Indeed, Sigil may free ride off Chalker's exclusive rights, for each 
time Chalker enjoins or licenses another, Sigil gains competitive advan-
tages in the industry. Of course, Sigil's competitors will not likely have 
access to the prior art upon which Sigil might have relied. 
This example illustrates that with the First Inventor Defense Act in 
place, we can no longer assume that accused infringers of business 
method patents will apply pertinent knowledge towards an patent inva-
lidity argument. A competitor of a patentee may well possess individual 
incentives to assert the first inventor defense instead. Each time an ac-
cused infringer asserts the first inventor defense in this manner, the pub-
lic interest of striking down invalid patents is defeated. Coupled with the 
problems of collective action and collusion, the first inventor defense 
provides another basis for concern over the integrity of the patent system 
in the field of business methods. 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR PATENT BOUNTIES 
Recognition that patent challenges present problems of collective 
action reveals that oppositions are unlikely to solve patent quality prob-
lems. Economic theory, experience, and analysis of the First Inventor 
Defense Act alike demonstrate that, opposition or not, private parties 
are insufficiently disposed to bring prior art to the attention of the Patent 
Office. A free ride off another's opposition to the patent, a share of the 
patentee's supracompetitive price or, in appropriate cases, reliance upon 
271. See generally Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780-82 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(discussing requirements of enablement and anticipation). 
272. See 35 U.S.CA. § 273(b)(6). 
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the first inventor defense ordinarily present superior alternatives to op-
posing a patent. 
Collective action problems are not insoluble. Often the government 
possesses the ability to change the rules of the game, enhancing the in-
centives of individuals to engage in desirable conduct.273 The patent 
quality crisis suggests two particular needs. First, applicants must be 
prodded into performing prior art searches and filing claims that define 
patentable advances over the prior art. Second, the patent law should 
encourage prompt third party disclosure of patent-defeating prior art to 
the Patent Office. , 
Established· federal practice suggests a mechanism for achieving 
both of these goals. Moiety statutes,274 qui tam actions,275 the False 
Claims Act276 and numerous administrative agency programs277 have long 
encouraged individuals to disclose information not within the possession 
of the government. These schemes typically encourage individuals to as-
sist in law enforcement- efforts through the award of a cash prize.278 
The Internal Revenue Service informant reward mechanism is ex-
emplary.279 Since at least 1867, the IRS has encouraged informants to re-
port violations of the tax laws and awarded a portion of any penalties re-
ceived as a result of these disclosures.28o IRS regulations establish that 
the bounty will generally not exceed fifteen percent of the taxes recov-
ered, with a cap of two million dollars.281 The IRS maintains the ano-
nymity of informants throughout the bounty process.282 This bounty sys-
tem has proven successful over the years, leading to the recovery of 
several billion dollars of unpaid taxes and the award of millions of dollars 
273. DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 14, at 370. Some private enterprises do challenge patents prior 
to being accused of infringement, of course, revealing market-originated resolution of this collective 
action problem. An industrial actor that believes its gains will outweigh those of his competitors may 
opt to oppose a patent. The challenger may be less able to develop a substitute product than others in 
the industry, for example, or may have made greater capital investment concerning the patented in-
vention than others. In such instances the free-rider problem is solved, for the challenger believes the 
patent is so crucial that the challenge occurs despite potential benefits to others. Concentrated indus-
tries also likely enjoy higher reexamination rates. Participants in oligopolic markets should exhibit 
less diffusion of responsibility and greater willingness to contest an issued patent, an effect that may 
partially account for heightened opposition rates in Europe. 
274. See Doe v. United States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
275. See 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1994) (false marking statute). 
276. See 31 U.S.c. §§ 3729-3733. 
277. See Matthew Lesko, Uncle Sam Pays Cash to Private Citizens Who Provide Information 
About Wrongdoings, CHI. TRIB.,Nov. 1, 1993, at 0. 
278. See Marsha J. Ferziger '& Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Pub-
lic Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1142. 
279. See 1.R.c. § 7623 (2000). 
280. See An Act to Amend Existing Laws Relating to Internal Revenue, and for Other Purposes, 
ch. 173, § 7, 14 Stat. 471,473 (1867). 
281. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998). 
282. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(e) (as amended in 1998). 
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in bounties.283 It also appears quite popular, as the IRS presently re-
ceives approximately ten thousand bounty applications each year.284 
The central proposal of this article is that the patent system should 
turn to this experience as it considers solutions to its current patent qual-
ity crisis. The Patent Office should establish a system of cash prizes, or 
bounties, to encourage private citizens to provide it with information 
pertinent to patentability. Members of the public who timely submit 
prior art that contributes to the rejection of a patent application would 
be eligible for the bounty. If funded via applicant fines, the proposed 
bounty program should also encourage inventors to draft patent applica-
tions with full cognizance of the most pertinent prior art. This article 
next reviews the workings of the proposed bounty and considers how the 
amount of the bounty should be set. 
A. The Mechanics of a Patent Bounty 
A regime of patent bounties might operate as follows. The Patent 
Office would publish applications prior to commencing substantive pat-
ent examination efforts. Alongside the application, a search report con-
sisting of the combined results of the applicant's prior art disclosures and 
the examiner search would also be made available. This publication 
would trigger a designated time period during which informants might 
submit pertinent prior art to the Patent Office. Informants would be re-
quired to provide a copy of disclosed references, a short explanation of 
their relevance, and a fee. 
Following expiration of the bounty period, substantive patent ex-
amination would commence. An examiner would review the search re-
port as well as any references submitted by informants. References 
originating from informants that are cumulative to the contents of the 
search report will be set aside. However, if the examiner issues a final 
rejection of any claim in the application over noncumulative prior art 
submitted by an informant, then the applicant would be fined and the in-
formant paid.285 If the applicant chose to appeal the rejection to the Pat-
ent Office Board, or subsequently to the courts, then the award of the 
bounty should be deferred until the final rejection is upheld. 
283. See Frank Green, Telling on Cheats: How to Profit by Putting the IRS on the Tax Fraud's 
Trail, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 29, 1998, at 11. 
284. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 1188. 
285. The term "final rejection" is a technical one in the patent law. The Patent Act allows an ap-
plicant to respond to an initial examiner rejection by amending the claims or through substantive ar-
gument. See 35 U.S.c. § 132 (1994). If the examiner remains unconvinced, then the initial rejection 
becomes a final rejection. Under this proposal, if the applicant traverses the examiner's rejection 
without amending the claims to account for an informant reference, then the bounty would not be 
awarded. In the event of multiple bounty seekers, the prize should go to the first informant to submit 
a patent-defeating reference. If the examiner relies upon a combination of references submitted by 
multiple informants, the informants could split the bounty. 
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The award of a bounty does' not necessarily mean that the applicant 
is denied the opportunity to obtain a patent. The inventor may file a so-
called continuing application and amend his claims in order to distinguish 
his invention from the cited references.286 This proposal contemplates a 
bounty period only when an application is initially filed, or in those rare 
cases where so-called new matter is added to the application.287 
Under this proposal, the Patent Office would retain both the iden-
tity of the applicant and the informant in confidence. Anonymity is a 
feature of many civil bounty schemes and its virtues should apply to the 
patent system as well.288 Anonymously published applications help pre-
vent collusion between potential informants and patentees. Otherwise 
we could expect that some informants would forward prior art references 
to the applicant rather than the Patent Office, hoping to obtain an 
amount larger than the potential bounty. The promise of anonymity 
would also encourage whistleblowers. A company employee, for exam-
ple, should be able to submit prior art to the Patent Office even if his 
employer is the applicant. The governing statute should further render 
employee covenants not to participate in the patent bounty program un-
enforceable.289 
The core virtue of a patent bounty is that it recruits members of the 
public to act as private patent examiners. With congressional policies in-
creasingly turning the Patent Office into a gutted house, we must stimu-
late the private sector to place prior art into the system as early as possi-
ble. We must also further burden applicants with the expense of locating 
the best prior art, whether they conduct the search themselves or are 
forced to pay another to do so. 
lt is important that awarded bounties be funded directly by an indi-
vidual patent applicant rather than be appropriated from the Patent Of-
fice budget. The prospect of a fine will encourage inventors to file patent 
applications of the appropriate scope. This framework also avoids net-
tlesome problems of collusion between informants and applicants. The 
specter of colluding individuals filing a sequence of bogus applications, 
followed by prompt informant disclosures of patent-defeating references 
and Patent Office award of a bounty from its general funds, should be 
avoided at all costs. 
Another merit of the proposed bounty statute is that it essentially 
includes its own sunset provision. If our current patent quality problems 
truly are transitional in character,290 then the bounty program would 
wither as the Patent Office expands its prior art libraries and improves its 
286. See id. § 120. 
287. See id. § 132. 
288. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 1157. 
289. See generally Jodi L. Short, Killing the Messenger: The Use of Nondisclosure Agreements to 
Silence the Whistleblower, 60 U. PI1T. L. REV. 1207 (1999) (arguing against the use of employee non-
disclosure agreements to silence whistleblowers). 
290. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
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searching capabilities. A Patent Office already possessed of all the rele-
vant prior art would find any informant submission cumulative and de-
cline to award a bounty. 
In order to be eligible for the bounty, informants should be charged 
a fee sufficient to cover Patent Office administrative expenses and to dis-
courage reference flooding. Informant submissions should also be pub-
lished promptly in order to minimize duplicative searching by others. A 
requirement that informants present their materials in electronic format 
and themselves upload the data to an Internet website appears apt. 
The class of potential patent informants should prove to be a di-
verse one. Competitors of patent applicants will likely be among those 
newly stimulated to apply for bounties. Other bounty seekers will arise 
from the industry of patent searchers that currently clusters around the 
great patent offices of the world. We can also expect that retired patent 
examiners would be particularly effective informants, but should be con-
cerned that knowledge of the application was gained during the course of 
Patent Office employment. The governing statute should proscribe 
bounty awards to former examiners for a set period following that indi-
vidual's last date of employment at the Patent Office.291 
Informants might also arise from a newly arisen class of detractors 
of the patent system. Most of this group consists of technically trained 
individuals who provide prior art searching services. Their principal 
method of promoting their services has been to fuel public concern over 
patent quality. Inspired by the outspoken Gregory Aharonian, this 
group combines the virtues of a public interest watchdog with the vices of 
a norm-enforcing community crank.292 Patent Office management has 
noted its displeasure at the often venomous commentary of these indi-
viduals and their deleterious effect upon examiner esprit-de-corps. A 
patent bounty would allow this class to offer positive contributions to the 
patent system, submitting pertinent prior art to the Patent Office instead 
of posting it on the Internet alongside cynical remarks. 
This bounty proposal is confined to software and business method 
applications. Problems of patent quality appear to loom the largest in 
these disciplines. Information economics and the first inventor defense 
also suggests that we have the most to fear about Patent Office errors 
here.293 Nothing prevents the expansion of this proposal to other sorts of 
inventions, however. Business method and software applications could 
serve as a testing ground for this bounty scheme as the Patent Office con-
siders expanding the program into additional fields. 
291. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 1147. 
292. See generally lenna Greene, Pundit or Pest?, 158 N.J. L.l. 372 (1999) (describing the efforts 
of Aharonian to monitor the activities of the patent office). 
293. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text. 
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B. Determining the Amount of the Bounty 
A crucial feature of any bounty system is the amount of the pay-
ment. If bounties are too low, then few informants will participate. If set 
too high, then a surplus of informants may seek to hit the jackpot. Much 
like an inefficient patent race, where rent-seeking participants dissipate 
the value of the patent in their rivalry to obtain it, a generous bounty 
could promote overinvestment in prior art research.294 An overly high 
bounty might also discourage too many inventors from seeking patent 
protection.295 
This article posits no definitive figure as to the optimal amount of 
the patent bounty. Further empirical research is needed to arrive at this 
figure. However, we have found pertinent factors that should inform the 
bounty calculation, however. These elements include current patent ac-
quisition and search fees, the sums associated with other bounty regimes, 
and behaviors we might influence by appropriately adjusting to the 
bounty. 
The financial liabilities of contemporary patent applicants provide 
an initial sense of the sums at stake. Patent applicants owe money both 
to the Patent Office and to their patent attorney. The Patent Office cur-
rently charges applicants $710 to file an application and $1240 to issue an 
approved patent application.296 The Patent Office has also established 
numerous surcharges and sundry assessments that often exceed these ba-
sic charges.297 Still, Patent Office fees are usually far less than attorney 
fees. Most attorneys charge fees "easily total[ing] many thousands of 
dollars" for the preparation of a simple patent application.298 A consid-
erable amount more is required for complex technologies, extended 
prosecution, or the filing of an appeal to the Patent Office Board. Patent 
applicants should know they have entered into a costly affair, and the 
possibility of a bounty award of several thousand dollars appears reason-
able. 
A second input should be prevailing market rates for a prior art 
search. Private enterprises frequently employ such searches in order to 
gauge the validity of an issued patent. Fees for a prior art patent and lit-
erature search begin in the neighborhood of $1000 but can climb much 
higher.299 Although typical prior art searches are conducted for a set, 
294. See ERIC RASMUSEN. GAMES AND INFORMATION 343--45 (2d ed. 1994). 
295. See id. 
296. See Pees and Payment of Money, 37 c.P.R. §§ 1.16(a), 1.18(a) (2000). 
297. See id. §§ 1.160-.20. 
298. Valerie Calloway, In the Process of Controverting Its Constitutionally Given Purpose the u.s. 
Patent System Discriminates Against Inventors with Limited Financial Means, 11 LAW & INEQ. 565, 
570-71 (1993). 
299. See Patent Validity and Invalidity Studies, at htlp:llwww.bustpatents.com (last visited Sept. 24, 
2(00) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review); see also Invention Patenting Group, at 
htlp:llwww.inventionpatenting.comllegalfees.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2000) (on file with the Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review). 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  346 2001
346 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2001 
certain fee, seekers of the proposed bounty bear additional risks. Not 
only might another informant be the first to submit particular prior art, 
the examiner may take a different view of the reference during prosecu-
tion. Plainly the bounty must be set at some higher amount in order to 
account for these risks, for otherwise competent prior art searchers 
would prefer other work. 
Experience with other bounty programs should also prove instruc-
tive. As many bounty systems base the amount of the award upon the 
payoff to the government,300 an award structure of little use to the Patent 
Office, this comparative approach may not initially appear promising. 
However, a variety of federal agencies, ranging from the National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service to the National Highway Traffic Safety Admini-
stration, provide for awards of fixed sums.301 A review of more discre-
tionary reward schemes should also be of interest. As well, tips to such 
authorities as the Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
often lead to the seizure of illegal drugs or other contraband that cannot 
be liquidated.302 Both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney 
General are still entitled to reward informants, however, and these offi-
cials are afforded considerable discretion in setting the amount of the in-
formant award.3D3 The policies of these authorities, the reward amounts, 
and the extent to which any changes in the reward policies have influ-
enced informant behavior would seem particularly helpful information to 
guide the law of patents. 
More theoretical concerns should also inform the practical. The 
patent bounty proposal surmises that private actors are superior informa-
tion providers as compared to current Patent Office bibliographic re-
sources.304 The patent community should therefore have few qualms 
about awarding a bounty to a private informant that is equal to or less 
than the amount spent by the Patent Office on information acquisition. 
A Patent Office determination of the average amount spent on prior art 
gathering and review costs for each patent application would seem of 
particular use in setting the bounty. 
There is much to be said for setting the bounty to a sum certain. 
The Patent Office need not establish a uniform bounty, but potential ap-
plicants and informants should know the potential sum at play for a par-
ticular application. A settled amount avoids the difficulties of evaluating 
the worth of disclosed information as well as arbitrary examiner deci-
300. For example, the False Claims Act calls for a reward of 15% to 30% of the penalty imposed 
upon individuals who defrauded the federal government. "A [Securities and Exchange Commission] 
bounty cannot exceed 10% of the government take," while at the Internal Revenue Service the typical 
bounty awarded is in the neighborhood of 15% of the recovery. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 
1146 tbl. 1, 1152. 
301. See id. at 1143-44 n.12. 
302. See id. at 1156. 
303. See 19 U.S.c. § 1619(a) (1994); 21 U.S.c. § 886(a) (1994). 
304. See supra notes 60-98 and accompanying text. 
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sions. A fixed reward also promotes efficient behavior among bounty 
seekers, who can discount the prospective award based upon individual 
risk assessments. 
Yet it is also tempting to adjust the bounty based upon the qualities 
of the information provided by the successful informant. The patent law 
features a notoriously broad definition of prior art. The costs of acquir-
ing information vary considerably among the different categories of eli-
gible information sources. For example, the costs of obtaining a perti-
nent century-old Romansch language pamphlet available at the public 
library in Lugano, Switzerland, is much higher than citing a lead story 
from last year's Science magazine. An accounting for these variable in-
formation acquisition costs could be reflected in the patent bounty. 
This sort of bounty adjustment could prove a powerful tool for in-
fluencing the behavior of applicants and bounty seekers. An argument 
could be made that the amount of the bounty should be increased when 
an informant's foreign, obscure reference proves patent-defeating. The 
better view seems to be that patent quality begins with applicants, how-
ever. Providing financial incentives for applicants to perform thorough 
prior art searches appears the best mechanism for achieving this goal. 
Under this view, the Patent Office should define a discrete number of 
publicly available databases, journals, and other common information 
sources. Informant disclosure of a prior art reference found in one· of 
these sources would increase the amount of the bounty by a fixed 
amount. This ruling would encourage patent applicants to perform due 
diligence with respect to designated repositories of prior art or poten-
tially face adverse financial consequences. 
The patent system includes a final feature pertinent towards setting 
the amount of a bounty. The Patent Office presently provides a fifty 
percent fee discount for so-called small entities: independent inventors, 
companies with less than 500 employees, and universities.305 Given the 
strength of congressional policies favoring small entities at the Patent Of-
fice, halving the amount of the bounty and concomitant fine for small en-
tities appears appropriate as well. 
VI. SCRUTINY OF THE BOUNTY 
The proposed patent bounty follows logically from the needs of the 
modern patent system and longstanding federal administrative practice. 
Still, adoption of a bounty regime within the patent law could prove a 
transformative event, fundamentally altering inventor decisions whether 
to seek patent protection, requiring careful administrative implementa-· 
tion, and creating an entire industry of patent bounty hunters. The dra-
305. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (1994). 
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matic nature of this proposal prompts several concerns that are worthy of 
further consideration here. 
A. Promoting Trade Secrecy 
The prospect that a bounty system may discourage individuals from 
seeking patent protection is a paramount concern. Valid sources of prior 
art are often difficult to discover or even unknowable.306 Even diligent 
and well-intentioned inventors might therefore be required to pay fines 
that are transferred to informants. Possible consequences of a bounty 
regime include increasing reliance upon trade secret protection and per-
haps even a decreasing rate of innovation.30? With patent rights poten-
tially more costly to obtain, prospective inventors may devote resources 
to activities other than invention. 
Although these arguments cannot be entirely discounted, there are 
several reasons to believe that they should not prove so worrisome as to 
defeat the patent bounty proposal. First, not every invention is amena-
ble to trade secret protection.308 Some inventions are fully disclosed dur-
ing their operation. Recently issued patents on methods of financing 
secondary education or training custodial personnel describe inventions 
of this nature.309 
The use of many other inventions does not fully expose them but is 
nonetheless sufficiently revealing to skilled artisans that trade secrecy is 
defeated. Many Internet-based business concepts, such as Ama-
zon.com's one-click ordering method, fall into this category.310 A cus-
tomer purchasing a book via a single click of her mouse button does not 
necessarily know how Amazon.com implemented this invention within 
an Internet environment. Nonetheless, a skilled computer scientist could 
readily write software to implement one-click ordering upon visiting the 
Amazon.com website. 
For these types of inventions, we should not suspect that the pros-
pect of paying a reasonable finder's fee for pertinent prior art should be 
overly discouraging to the would-be patent applicant. The inventor 
would be unable to maintain the invention as a trade secret for very long. 
Although copyright presents an alternative for inventions with a software 
implementation, this form of protection is more strongly tied to the 
wording of the program text and requires derivation from the inventor.311 
306. See supra notes 67-98 and accompanying text. 
307. See Merges, supra note 5, at 599. . 
308. See Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective, 78 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 691-93 (1996). 
309. See U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued Dec. 22, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484 (issued Sept. 
15,1998). 
310. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. 
311. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (suggesting that software may be copyrighted, although concur-
rence sees most software as not copyrightable). 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  349 2001
No.1] A PROPOSAL FOR PATENT BOUNTIES 349 
In sum, many inventors who seek intellectual property protection have 
no alternative but to seek patent protection. 
Second, the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 indicates a favor-
able congressional posture towards trade secret proprietors in the area of 
business methods. Legislative reports accompanying the First Inventor 
Defense Act indicate that Congress intended this statute to solve transi-
tional problems accompanying the sudden patentability of business 
methods.312 Yet the First Inventor Defense Act is prospeCtive in charac-
ter, available in any litigation commenced after November 29,1999.313 
That Congress did not limit the first inventor defense to trade se-
crets developed prior to the State Street Bank decision suggests a special 
solicitude for business methods held as trade secrets. Secure that they 
can employ a trade secret unhindered by a subsequent patentee, business 
method practitioners stand on steadier footing than trade secret holders 
within other disciplines.314 A message from the First Inventor Defense 
Act is that we have less to fear about trade secrecy in the area of business 
methods. Our long history of advances in the area of business methods, 
despite the uncertainty of patent protection, reinforces this conclusion.315 
Finally, desperate times call for desperate measures. The increasing 
erosion of our patent system calls for decisive corrective action. In keep-
ing with the congressional mandate for a self-supporting Patent Office, 
the users of our patent system must bear the burdens of improving it. 
While assessing whether fear of financing a bounty would drive many in-
ventors into hiding, we should recognize that patent acquisition is al-
ready an expensive business. If the amount of the bounty is set to an ap-
propriate level,316 then we are unlikely to observe a decline in patent 
applicants. 
B. Signaling 
Anonymity is a core feature of the proposed bounty patent. With-
out such a guarantee, informants may fear reprisals from enterprises that 
have been forced to pay them a bounty. Potential informants would also 
be able to collude with the applicant, burying rather than disclosing pat-
ent-defeating prior art.317 
312. See H.R. REp. No. 106-287, pt. 1, at 46 (1999). 
313. See Richard Neifeld, Analysis of the New Patent Laws Enacted November 29,1999,82 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 181, 195 (2000). 
314. See supra notes 257-64 and accompanying text. 
315. See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent 
Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 78 
(1999) ("In the absence of data showing a need to spur innovation in business methods, it is equally 
plausible that the spur of competition and the long tradition of competition by emulation have been 
sufficient to provide an adequate level of innovation in methods of doing business."). 
316. See supra notes 280-91 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev.  350 2001
350 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2001 
Experience with other bounty programs suggests that the mainte-
nance of informant identities in confidence is an achievable objective.318 
Preservation of the applicant's anonymity presents a much more legiti-
mate concern, however. The number of actors on the inventive forefront 
is quite small in many disciplines. Applicants might also market products 
that embody the claimed invention or simply convene press conferences 
in order to announce their advances. 
Experience also teaches us that enterprises have engaged in ingen-
ious signaling techniques when it suits their interest. One noteworthy 
example involved FCC airwave spectrum auctions that employed simul-
taneous bidding. Certain bidders allegedly signaled their intentions to 
pursue licenses in certain locations by employing their telephone area 
codes or other individual indicia within their bids.319 As compared to a 
single dollar amount, patent applications provide a robust medium that 
applicants could manipulate to reveal their own identities. Inventors en-
joy a great deal of discretion in drafting these often lengthy texts. Even 
well-intentioned applicants may have developed a distinct style that be-
trays their identities, despite the rigid genre. 
Although these concerns cannot be eliminated, there is much rea-
son to believe that signaling would not defeat the goals of the proposed 
patent bounty. In the realm of software and Internet-based business 
concepts, considerable public commentary suggests the existence of an 
outspoken, technically astute community of free thinkers. These indi-
viduals appear much more likely to beat down the doors of Crystal City 
with prior art references than collaborate with those who would appro-
priate a piece of the Internet. More generally, the Patent Office includes 
an Office of Enrollment and Discipline that is accountable for policing 
applicant abuses. 
C. Agency Discretion and Judicial Review 
The proposed bounty may raise concerns over Patent Office ad-
ministration of the bounty regime and the possibility of judicial over-
sight. A Patent Office Solicitor's Office beleaguered by satellite litiga-
tion brought by disgruntled bounty seekers or fined applicants is not a 
pleasant prospect. In a bounty regime, virtually every patent application 
would seem pregnant with the possibility for peripheral disputes. 
Standing bounty provisions again provide the answer. Among oth-
ers, the Securities and Exchange Commission bounty statute renders re-
ward decisions "final and not subject to judicial review."32o The case law 
similarly establishes that payments to IRS informants lies wholly within 
318. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 1175. 
319. DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 14, at 517. 
320. 15 V.S.c. § 78u-1(e) (1994). 
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the discretion of the Commissioner.321 Without apology, the proposed 
patent bounty statute should read similarly. The complexity of the ex-
amination task, the vagaries of the interpretation of patent applications 
and prior art references, and the volume of applications suggest that 
agency discretion is paramount in this context. Standardized procedures, 
fixed bounty amounts and the ultimate safeguard of political accountabil-
ity should check arbitrary Patent Office decisions in this context. 
D. Ethics and Efficiencies of Organizational Behavior 
Principles of the patent community provide a final source of objec-
tion to the proposed patent bounty. Opportunistic snitches have been 
maligned long before the days of Linda Tripp.322 Civil bounty schemes 
too have also been called into question on moral grounds. For example, 
Senator Harry Reid of Nevada recently labeled the IRS informant pro-
gram "Rewards for Rats" and called for its repea1.323 Inspired as it is by 
existing civil bounty regimes, the proposed patent bounty might prompt 
similar concerns. 
In most circumstances the proposed patent bounty statute steers 
clear of these moral hazards. A patent informant does not accuse others 
of wrongdoing, but instead discloses pertinent information of a technical 
nature. The anonymity of all participants in the patent bounty system 
should further encourage a neutral environment for prior art research 
and disclosure. Patent bounty seekers would be less stool pigeons than 
research assistants, bibliographers, and practical historians who could 
contribute meaningfully to our patent examination regime. 
The possibility of a patent bounty may give rise to additional con-
cerns with the employment relationship, however. Employers might be 
wary of the prospect of employees secretly opposing their patent acquisi-
tion efforts. They may wish to erect Chinese walls, develop nondisclo-
sure practices, and restrict access to technical information that could be 
used against them. Not only may these reconfigurations of work patterns 
prove costly and inefficient, they may diminish synergistic interactions 
between individuals that often leads to innovation.324 
Although this concern cannot be wholly discounted, it must be as-
sessed against a legal and commercial background where firms already 
possess considerable incentives to conceal valuable information. Enter-
prises presently must implement reasonable secrecy measures for infor-
mation to achieve protection as a trade secret.325 Many innovative com-
panies already insist that employees undertake covenants not to 
321. See 1.R.c. § 7623 (West Supp. 1999). 
322. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 278, at 1141. 
323. See 144 CONGo REC. S4379, S4398 (daily ed. May 6,1998) (statement of Sen. Reid). 
324. See Rockwell Graphic Sys. V. DEV Indus., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991). 
325. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39(f) (1995). 
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compete.326 Even where an employer has no intention of seeking relief 
under the intellectual property or contract laws, secrecy measures are 
conventionally employed as a matter of common sense and self-help. Al-
though a patent bounty program might reinforce these norms, its impact 
would surely be felt only on the margins. 
A final concern is that an unscrupulous employee might encourage 
his employer to file a patent application, all the while withholding infor-
mation that would defeat it. Once the Patent Office publishes the em-
ployer's application, then the employee or his agent might disclose this 
information to the Patent Office and request a bounty. Although any 
sort of public reward regime will undoubtedly present corrupt employees 
with an opportunity to seek graft, Patent Office regulations should go a 
long way towards policing such conduct. These regulations impose a 
duty of candor upon inventors, their patent attorneys, and every other 
person substantially involved in the preparation and prosecution of an 
application.327 Upon submitting prior art believed pertinent to a particu-
lar application, informants should be required to certify both that they 
are not under an obligation of disclosure with respect to that application, 
and that they have not derived the disclosed information from another 
who is under such a duty. The reminder that punishment accompanies 
the submission of a false oath, along with selective scrutiny and enforce-
ment by the Office of Enrollment and Discipline, ought to curb this po-
tential abuse. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The assertive vision of the patent system championed by such deci-
sions as Diamond v. Diehr and State Street Bank should have been met 
with more vigorous resistance. The sheer number of issued patents 
claiming such concepts as Internet-based business models,328 financial 
methods,329 and instruction techniques330 suggests that the time for debate 
over patent eligibility is past, however. The law is now well established 
that inventors who properly prepare applications face few barriers to 
patenting beyond those associated with the prior art. Having shepherded 
the patent law to these breathtaking heights, we are left to address the 
apparent difficulties the Patent Office has encountered in examining ap-
plications from unfamiliar disciplines. Lean times call for bold solutions 
to resolve this fundamental crisis of integrity within the patent system. 
This article calls upon the patent community to recognize that prob-
lems of collective action and collusion have contributed to our current 
326. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Sili-
con Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,603 (1999). 
327. See 37 c.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1999). 
328. See U.S. Patent No. 5,797,127 (issued Aug. 18, 1998). 
329. See U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484 (issued Sept. 15, 1998). 
330. See U.S. Patent No. 5,851,117 (issued Dec. 22, 1998). 
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patent quality problems. The newly minted first inventor defense can 
only accelerate the decline in the legitimacy of issued business method 
patents. The proposed patent bounty would counter these trends in ways 
no opposition can, effectively aligning the incentives of both inventors 
and third parties with the public interest. Employing private citizens as 
partners in patent examination offers a fiscally realizable solution for re-
storing order to our patent system and ultimately lowering its social 
costs. 
